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STATE OF MAINE 
EXEC.UTIVE DEPARTMENT 
STATE PLANNING OFFICE 
I 
JOHN A. McKERNAN, JR. 
GOVERNOR October 4, 1987 
RICHARD H. SILKMAN 
DIRECTOR 
The Honorable John R. McKernan, Jr. 
Gover~or of Maine 
State House Station One 
Augusta, Maine 04333 
Dear Goverrior McKernan: 
On November 3, Maine voters will decide if Maine Yankee 
should be allowed to continue to operate. This marks the third 
time that Maine voters are being asked to decide the fate of the 
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant. Because of the importance of 
this decision, you have asked us to review, update, and expand 
upon the findings of the 1986 Maine Yankee Shutdown Assessment. 
We have found the 1986 study to be essentially sound. This 
work expands upon the 1986 report by updating the discussion of 
legal issues posed by the referendum and by extending the 
analysis of economic and environmental issues. Our work benefits 
from events and research subsequent to 1986 including: 
judicial decisions, such as the First Lutheran case decided 
this June by the U.S. Supreme Court; 
the proposed Central Maine Power power purchase from Hydro 
Quebec and our subsequent analysis of it; 
proposals for competitive domestic power production 
submitted to Central Maine Power in response to their 
solicitation; and 
analysis of the April 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear 
power station in the Soviet Union. 
A decision regarding a state-mandated shutdown of Maine 
Yankee raises the question of State authority to effect such a 
shutdown. While it is always very difficult to predict how a 
court will rule on federal preemption, as with the 1986 report, 
we find it highly unlikely that a State law closing a nuclear 
plant due to waste disposal and safety concerns could withstand 
judicial review. A 1983 Supreme Court decision f£rmly upheld 
federal authority in the entire field of nuclear safety concerns. 
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The higher cost of replacement power, estimatd to be $779 
million (present value) over the period 1989-2015, will raise 
electricity rates in Maine by between 5 and 10% statewide. This 
rate effect would vary around the State,, however. Rates in 
Aroostook County_would be most affected because of its heavier 
dependence on Maine Yankee as a source of power. In fact, rates 
in Aroostook County could increase by between 8 and 20% between 
1989 and 2008. Lower dependency on Maine Yankee will moderate 
rat~ imp~~~n. .the Ce~tral Maine Power and Bangor Hydro Electric 
reg1ons, R ·· · ;· . hem 1n the 5 to 9% range. But I must strongly 
emphasize that thi · ct one component of the total cost of a 
shutdo'wn. Maine taxpayers will have to bear the cost of any 
compensation determined to be owed to the owners of Maine Yankee. 
Closing Maine Yankee in 1988, 20 years ahead of its 
scheduled retirement, would affect the Maine economy in several 
ways. First, increased electric rates will raise production 
costs of Maine businesses and reduce disposable income of Maine 
households. We have estimated that replacing Maine Yankee power 
will add $779 million (present value) to energy costs in Maine 
between 1989 and 2015. 
Second, the cost of any compensation due the owners of Maine 
Yankee, possibly over $1 billion, would be borne by Maine 
taxpayers, further reducing their income and draining capital 
from the State. Finally, the Town of Wiscasset and surrounding 
communities would experience the loss of a major employer and 
taxpayer. 
The need for replacement power may offset some of the 
economic costs of a mandatory shutdown. Replacing Maine Yankee 
entirely with domestic power could create up to 1600 jobs and 
generate $575 million in income (present value). However, the 
net effect of these economic impacts is to reduce income in Maine 
by $1.38 billion and permanently eliminate 1390 jobs between 1989 
and 2008. 
The principal benefit to be derived from an early shutdown 
of Maine Yankee would be the elimination of the risk of a 
catastrophic operations accident at the Wiscasset facility. The 
April 1986 accident at the Soviet Union's Chernobyl nuclear power 
station has heightened public concerns regarding the safety of 
nuclear power in general. 
While closing Maine Yankee eliminates the threats associated 
with an operating nuclear plant, those associated with 
decommissioning and waste disposal remain. The outcome of the 
referendum will have no impact on the selection of Maine as a 
high-level nuclear waste site. We can find no connection between 
the production of nuclear waste at Maine Yankee and the site 
selection process established by the Department of Energy. 
Moreover, sources of replacement power--biomass, hydro, oil and 
Canadian imports--will, themselves, pose significant 
environmental and health threats. 
Comparing the risk and consequences of a catastrophic 
accident against the economics of increased energy costs presents 
a formidable challenge. Quantifying the economic costs of an 
early shutdown, as presented here, is an effort to put this 
complex issue into perspective. As noted in this report, the 
actual costs of replacing Maine Yankee could vary considerably 
from these estimates. Of particular importance to the costs of 
replacing Maine Yankee are the price of replacement power, the 
actual cost of operating Maine Yankee over the next 20 years, and 
the basis upon which the owners of the facility will be 
compensated, if compensation is required. 
Whatever the costs of closing Maine Yankee, a vote to shut 
down the plant will have an impact on the lives of every Maine 
citizen. It is crucial that a decision so critical to our future 
be based upon as clear an understanding of its consequences as 
possible. 
It is my hope that this study adds to a clearer 
understanding of the issues surrounding an early shutdown of 
Maine Yankee. Thank you for the opportunity to serve you and the 
people of Maine in this complex issue. 87:5/ / /( ,._( 
,{ich~rd H. Silkman 
RHS:nv 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
On November 3, Maine voters will be asked to decide whether Maine 
Yankee, or any other high-level nuclear waste producing facility, should be 
allowed to operate in this State, or whether Maine Yankee should be closed 
before its scheduled shutdown in 2008. Because of the important implications 
of this decision, Governor John R. McKernan, Jr. directed the State Planning 
Office with the assistance of the Office of Energy Resources, Public Advocate, 
and the Advocacy Staff of the Public Utilities Commission, to examine the legal 
and technical constraints and the costs and benefits to Maine of an early 
shutdown of Maine Yankee. 
An assessment of this issue was submitted by these agencies to 
Governor Joseph E. Brennan in May, 1986. Subsequent legal decisions, more 
detailed studies of the Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union, and analyses of 
Maine energy alternatives in conjunction with the review of the proposed Hydro 
Quebec power purchase provide new insight into the implications of an early 
shutdown of Maine Yankee. 
This analysis reviews the findings of the 1986 report, updates the legal 
issues posed by the referendum, and expands the analysis of economic effects. 
In addition, it presents the results of examinations of the Chernobyl nuclear 
accident and a review of the environmental issues surrounding energy 
alternatives. 
SUMMARY OF THE 1986 MAINE YANKEE REPORT 
Maine Yankee Assessment: A Report to Governor Joseph E. Brennan. 
1986 analyzed the legal, technical, and economic issues associated with a 
forced early shutdown of Maine Yankee. 
Legal Issues 
The 1986 analysis, based on a legal opinion of the Attorney General, 
found it unlikely thatthe State of Maine has the legal authority to force an early 
2 
shutdown of Maine Yankee on the basis of safety considerations of nuclear 
plant operations. Citing a 1983 Supreme Court decision that federal authority in 
nuclear power overrides State concerns regarding health and safety, the 1986 
report noted that State action would require Congressional repeal of the 
preemptive features in federal nuclear-related statutes. 
The report also found "no more than a tenuous legal connection" 
between the presence of a nuclear power generating plant and the placement 
of a high-level waste repository in Maine. It noted that an early shutdown of 
Maine Yankee would still leave its existing wastes to be disposed of and would 
have no significant impact on the nation's nuclear waste problem. 
Costs and Benefits of a Mandatory Shutdown 
The principle benefit of an early shutdown of Maine Yankee is the 
elimination of the risk of a catastrophic accident. The report also noted the 
benefit associated with the cessation of production in Maine of low-level nuclear 
waste and spent fuel. The costs of an early shutdown-higher energy costs to 
households and industry, potential compensation to out-of-state owners, and 
the jobs lost at Maine Yankee-were estimated to fall between $500 million and 
$6.8 billion with a consequent loss of between 1000 and 1800 jobs. 
THE 1987 UPDATE 
This analysis reviews many of the issues discussed in the 1986 report. 
In addition, it benefits from events and research subsequent to the 1986 
publication. Included among these are: 
• a number of judicial decisions, including the First Lutheran case 
decided in June of this year regarding the "temporary taking" of 
private property; 
• the proposed CMP power purchase from Hydro Quebec 
submitted in March and its subsequent analysis by the State 
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Planning Office, Office of Energy Resources, Public Advocate, and 
Departments of Conservation and Environmental Protection 1; 
• proposals for domestic power production competitive with the 
purchase of power from Hydro Quebec submitted in response to a 
request for proposals issued by Central Maine Power; and 
• a summary of analyses of the April1986 accident at the Chernobyl 
nuclear power station in the Soviet Union. 
The legal issues presented here are discussed in somewhat more detail 
than in the 1986 report. A more comprehensive analysis of the economic costs 
and benefits of an early shutdown is provided including the potential impacts of 
compensation costs, and a more detailed breakdown of the regional rate 
impacts of an early shutdown. Finally, this report presents an assessment of the 
implications of past power facility accidents and the environmental 
consequences of alternative energy sources. 
1 Pre!imjnaey Report on the Effects of the Proposed Purchase of Power from Hydro Quebec, 
State Planning Office, May. 1987. 
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2. LEGAL ISSUES* 
Two principal legal questions are raised by the proposal to force an early 
shutdown of Maine Yankee: what authority exists for Maine to order a nuclear 
plant shutdown on health and safety grounds? If authority can be established, 
what is the value of the Maine Yankee nuclear plant and how much must Maine 
taxpayers compensate its owners as a result of a mandatory early shutdown? 
Although these issues were examined in the 1986 Maine Yankee 
shutdown assessment, they require reexamination in light of several recent 
United States Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the issues of federal 
preemption and just compensation. 
FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF A STATE-MANDATED SHUTDOWN 
The Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, provides 
Congress with the power to preempt state law. When a state law or regulation 
establishes requirements inconsistent with federal legislation, the federal courts 
evaluate the necessity of preempting state law. There are a number of federal 
statutes which may conflict with, or preempt, a state law prohibiting the 
generation of nuclear waste. These include: the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982; and the Federal Power Act of 1936. 
To date, no Maine court has reviewed the question of state authority to 
regulate radioactive waste generation in the context of federal law. However, 
courts in Maine have evaluated federal preemption of state laws in other 
matters. For example, a Maine law mandating severance pay in plant closings 
was recently upheld by both the Maine and United States Supreme Courts, 
notwithstanding issues of federal preemption. In this case, the courts concluded 
that the federal jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board did not 
* This is derived from a legal analysis provided by the Public Advocate. See appendix. 
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preempt the Maine law, given State interests in preventing economic 
dislocation due to plant closings.2 
In a number of federal and state courts elsewhere, however, this issue 
has received close examination with the consistent result that state authority 
has been found to have been preempted and, therefore unconstitutional under 
the Supremacy Clause. (See especially U.S. v. The City of New York.3) Based 
on these numerous precedents which set forth under two distinct theories of 
federal preemption, enactment of the 1987 Maine Yankee referendum is 
unlikely to survive legal challenges in federal court.4 
With particular reference to the issue of nuclear waste raised by the 
referendum, the Atomic Energy Act preempts state regulation of nuclear power 
safety and radiation hazards. This was upheld in a 1983 Supreme Court 
decision from California, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy 
Resources Commission .s In that case, the Court held that: 
"State safety regulation is not preempted only when it conflicts with 
federal law. Rather the Federal government has occupied the entire 
field of nuclear safety concerns ... "6 (Italics added) 
A state law closing a nuclear plant due to waste disposal and safety concerns 
would undoubtedly be found unconstitutional, barring Congressional 
amendment of the Atomic Energy Act. 
2 Pirector of Bureau of Labor Standards y. Fort Halifax Packing Co .. 510A2 1054 (ME 1986), cert. 
den., _US_1987. See however, Baysjde Enterprises Inc. v. Maine Agricultural Bargaining 
.6.Q.ard 513 A2 1355 (ME 1986) where Maine law was preempted by the federal Agricultural Fair 
Practices Act. 
3 643 FS 604 (SDNY,1978). 
4 The theories can be summaried as follows: the Atomic Energy Act preempts state regulation of 
nuclear power safety and radiation hazards; the Federal Power Act preempts state regulation over 
wholesale sales of electricity in interstate commerce. 
5 461 us 190 (1983). 
sop. Cit, pages 212-213. 
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JUST COMPENSATION 
Both the Maine and United States Constitutions provide assurance that 
private property may not be taken for a public purpose without payment of "just 
compensation". These Constitutional guarantees, and the state and federal 
court cases interpreting them, hinge on three successive issues: 
When does the State have power to take private property? 
If such power is lawfully used, does the State owe compensation? 
By what measure of value must compensation be awarded? 
Each of these questions presents different issues for consideration in the· 
context of a forced shutdown of the Maine Yankee power plant. 
State Power to Take Private Property 
A state typically exercises its power to take private property by means of 
its powers of eminent domain. The use of this extraordinary power has 
prompted numerous courts to warn of the care necessary in evaluating whether 
compensation is owed from such a taking. 
There is considerable Maine and U.S. Supreme Court precedent for the 
proposition that, when the state properly exercises its police powers to protect 
the public health and safety the complete elimination of a non-conforming 
business does not create a compensable loss under the Fifth Amendment or the 
Maine Constitution. 
While there must be a public use to justify a state taking, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has stated that it is proper to defer to the Legislature (or in the 
case of the 1987 Referendum to the voters) in determining whether the public 
use is a reasonable one. Under current Fifth Amendment standards, it appears 
that as long as the public use merely represents a "conceivable public 
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purpose", a state will satisfy the threshold public purpose requirement. It 
appears likely that the 1987 Referendum would pass this threshold test. 
Compensation Due Only When a Taking Has Occurred 
Just compensation is owed only in circumstances where the courts find 
that a constitutional taking has occurred. No taking occurs or is compensation 
owed unless the state interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations to 
a major and unsupportable degree. Recent Maine Law Court decisions go 
further: just compensation may be due only in cases where the market value of 
the condemned property has been reduced to zero. Due to the fact that the 
affected property retained possible rental income potential or could be sold, the 
Law Court concluded that no taking had occurred in a recent case: 
It is clear from the preponderance of the believable evidence that 
beneficial and valuable uses of their property remain available to the 
Halls despite the denial of a building permit by the B.E.P. Accordingly, 
we hold that there has been no taking of the Hall property in violation 
of article 1, section 21 of the Maine Constitution. Hall v. Board of 
Environmental Protection. A2 (1987), slip. op. at 5, 7/14/87. 
It is by no means certain that either a federal court or the Maine Law Court 
would construe the U.S. Constitution requirements on this basis in the case of a 
state-mandated closure of Maine Yankee.? 
In general, when property is rendered "substantially useless" due to state 
action, a compensable taking has occurred.8 The question of whether the 
forced closure of Maine Yankee constitutes a compensable taking will hinge on 
interpretations of fact: will the Maine Yankee owners retain significant 
?such an analysis would presumably consider whether the Wiscasset site could continue to 
provide value for its owners by generating electricity by non-nuclear means or whether the costs 
of such a conversion is prohibitive. 
8Sjbley y. lnhabHants of the Town of Wells, 462 A 29, 31 (Me 1983); LURC v. White, 521 A 710 
(Me 1987). 
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beneficial uses of their property after closure, will the public utility status of the 
owners insure mitigation of any loss, or will the value of the property realistically 
be reduced to zero-? In addition, the court will be guided by fundamental 
principles of fairness: 
"The purpose of forbidding uncompensated takings of private property for 
public use is "to bar government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole." Penn Central at 1027 citing Armstrong v. US 364, US 
40, 49 (1960). 
Measure of Value For a Compensable Taking 
The remaining questions concern the proper measurement of the Maine 
Yankee owners' loss should compensation be due. The courts have 
consistently ruled that compensation, when justified, should be based on the 
"fair market value" of the asset. In this case, three measures of such value could 
be applied. In descending monetary value, these three are: the costs of 
constructing a "substitute facility" elsewhere; the economic value of the power 
produced at the Maine Yankee plant; or the net book value of the power plant, 
as recorded for ratemaking by the Public Utilities Commission and by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
Replacing Maine Yankee with a substitute facility could cost between $3-
5 billion, based on completion of recent nuclear power plants of Maine 
Yankee's size or greater. While Maine Yankee's owners are obligated under 
state utility laws to provide electricity to the public, they are not specifically 
required to generate that electricity at a nuclear facility. Consequently, it would 
appear that the "substitute facilities" standard would not be required in the case 
of compensation due Maine Yankee's owners. 
Since large nuclear power plants are rarely bought and sold, the value of 
Maine Yankee on an open market will be exceedingly difficult to establish using 
a comparable sales standard. Rather, the value of power generated at Maine 
Yankee during the remaining years of its NRC license will probably be used as 
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a reasonable approximation of fair market value. The cost of replacement power 
was selected in the 1986 State Planning Office study as the most objective 
standard for measuring any compensation owed to Maine Yankee's owners. 
The third measure of fair market value is the net book value of the facility. 
There is a question, however, of whether Maine Yankee's value can properly be 
measured by the net book value of the facility as recorded in regulatory 
accounting practice. This question ultimately can only be determined by a 
court, and is subject to substantial conflicting claims. On the one hand, the 
courts have repeatedly discounted claims of loss for future profits as not 
compensable under the Fifth Amendment.9 Hence, the Maine Yankee owners' 
claim for compensation on a future return on the net book value of their asset 
($209,339,893 as of June 30, 1987, including recent construction work ) is 
subject to challenge. On the other hand, numerous courts have distinguished 
as inconsistent the underlying purposes of ratemaking valuation of utility 
property and of Fifth Amendment compensation. Maine Yankee owners will 
undoubtedly point to something in excess of net book value as the measure 
regularly upheld in the case of public takings of private property. 
Whichever of these three measure is ultimately determined by the courts 
to apply, the actual impact of the 1987 Referendum will be borne by two 
groups-Maine taxpayers and Maine electricity consumers, or ratepayers. 
Maine taxpayers will bear the full cost of compensating out-of-state owners, the 
effect of which will constitute a transfer from Maine's General Fund to the rest of 
New England equal to 50°/o of the fair market value of Maine Yankee. The 
ratepayers, on the other hand, will have to bear the full cost of any and all power 
necessary to replace the electricity generated by Maine Yankee for use within 
Maine. This distinction is important because some taxpayers are not ratepayers 
and some ratepayers are not taxpayers.1 o Thus, the consequences of a 
9"The opportunity to use property for future profit is not such a fundamental attribute of 
ownership [as to require compensation]" Seyen Island Land Co. v. Maine LURC, 450 A2 475, 
note 10 (Me. 1982), quoting Andrus y. Allard, 444 US 51, 60 (1980). 
10 There is a substantial number of taxpayers who are not ratepayers of CMP, BHE, or MPS. 
These include all the customers of Maine's publicly-owned in five towns, four cooperatives, and 
four islands. 
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mandatory early shutdown will be different for individuals or businesses in 
Maine depending on how the Legislature, the Public Utilities Commission, and 
the courts treat the compensation payment. The overall impacts on the State, 
however, will be similar and are discussed in Section 3. 
LENGTH AND COSTS OF LITIGATION 
The 1987 Referendum could well set in process a complex and time-
consuming series of court challenges to the new law. The fact that these 
questions have not previously been litigated in the context of a forced nuclear 
plant closure will only add to the time and expense of these challenges. 
Because any final judicial decision upholding the 1987 Referendum could well 
stimulate similar efforts in other states, it is likely that the legal resources 
available to the Maine Yankee owners will be substantial. 
Consequently, it is likely that the litigation triggered by enactment of the 
Referendum will not be concluded until well into the next decade, and will be 
quite costly. It is not clear whether the costs of this litigation are precluded from 
recovery at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for wholesale 
ratemaking purposes. It is likely that, in future proceedings before the Maine 
Public Utilities Commission, the recovery of these litigation costs in the retail 
rates would, itself, be litigated. 
A more important issue is whether the State would owe compensation 
from the date of the Referendum's enactment, or from the date that a court finally 
rules that compensation is due. Hypothetically, this later date could be 1992, if 
Maine Yankee is shut down during this litigation period. 11 Until recently, the 
answer to this question was relatively simple: Maine Yankee's owners would 
have to wait for compensation until the date of a final court determination and 
then only after all proper procedures and remedies had been pursued. At that 
point, compensation could well be prospective only, and not encompass any 
claim of taking for the period covered by the appeal itself. 
11 Maine Yankees owners could seek a temporary restraining order to prevent enforcement of the 
Maine law closing the plant. 
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However, this conclusion is now subject to considerable doubt. A 1987 
United States Supreme Court decision has for the first time concluded that, if 
Fifth Amendment concerns ultimately compel payment of just compensation, 
compensation is also owed for any "temporary taking" which occurred while the 
issue was before the courts. First· English Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, _US_, slip. op. 6/9/87. In cases where a 
condemnee has been denied all use of its property during the appeal period 
prior to a successful appeal, failure to provide "payment of fair value for the use 
of the property during this period of time would be a constitutionally insufficient 
remedy." 
Based o~ this recent decision, it appears probable that replacement 
power costs, or some other measure of fair value, would be awarded Maine 
Yankee's owners for the appeal period, if Maine Yankee does not operate 
during the appeal period. However, unless a court ultimately upholds the 
constitutionality of the Referendum in a final judgment, and finds that a 
compensable taking has occurred, no compensation would be owed Maine 
Yankee's owners. 
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3. ECONOMIC ISSUES I 
The electricity supplied. by Maine utilities is generated from various· 
sources. Maine Yankee, with an aver~ge capacity of 8.40 MW, produces, on 
average, about 4.8 b!l~~on kwh per year, provides about 27o/o of all electricity 
sold by Maine utilities, and supplies 22o/o of all the electricity consumed in- . 
~~:;;:;~~~ ,'"'~ -' . 
Maine. An early shutdown of this facility will hecessi~ate replacing that portion 
of Maine's electricity needs currently fulfilled py Maine Yankee. 
Closing Maine Yankee in 1988, 20 years ahead, of its scheduled -
-retirement, would affect the Maine economy in several ways. First, securing 
. ' I ' 
replacement power, both in the short and long run, will increase ener-gy costs to 
Maine consumers and businesses. Second, th~ cost of .any compensation due 
the owners of Maine Yankee would be borne by Maine taxpayers, furtrer 
reducing their income, and draining ca~ital from the State. Finally, the Town of 
Wi~ca~set _and surrounding communities would ~xperi,ence the loss of a major , 
employer and property taxpayer. 
Some of these adverse effects will be offset by the economic 
consequences· of creating replacement power capacity and energy_ in Maine. 
The shift to additional domestic energy pro~uction, for example, will create job 
opportunities and tax revenues as a result of building, operating, and fueling 
new power facilities. Er'!lployment \will also be created in the design, sale, 
installation, and per~?lPS production, of energy-saving devices. 
REPLACEMENT POWER ALTERNATIVES 
Replacement of the power lost due to an early s~utdown of Maine 
Yankee would likely come from a mix of sources. ·In the short-run, replacement 
power would come from the same sources currently tapped w~en Maine · 
Yankee shuts down for maintenance. These may include underutilized oil-fired 
plants in Maine, the least expensive available units in the New England Power 
Pool, and special arrangements with New Brunswick. Conditions for securing 
this short-term power are less onerous today ttlan they were three years ago, 
, 
I 
13 
and are likely to be in the future, largeJy because of low pil prices and a 
. \ . ' 
Canadian ~ower surplus. 
' 
A shutdown decision today would have long-term implications~ Over the 
n,ext twe_nty years, it wo4ld be necessary to develop new sources of electric 
capacity to replace Maine· Yank~e. · Intensified conservation, domestically 
generate9 biomass, more small hyqroelectric facilities, oil, natural gas, and 
coal p·ower, and the inO(eased importat.ion of Canadian-produced power· make 
up the rartge-of alternative power sources like!y to be tapped over this long-
term.< At ~he same·.-tim.e, Maine's total. energy needs continue to grow and 
electricity .rates increase. The. ne.ed to meet bqth the replacement power needs 
from. an ea~ly shutdown of Maine Yankee, and increasing energy demand will 
' . (. , . , \«' I 
ma~e the proposed importation of Hydro Quebec power by Central Maine 
. I 
Power more co.mpelling. 
.... 
Two recent devel-opments indicate a larger potential for available future 
energy capacity than previously ~xpected. The recent Central Maine Power 
proposal to purchase large blocks .of power from Hydro Quebec has enhanced 
potential .Canadian import options. In addition, industrial firms and independent 
power producers in Maine have proposed over 1400 MW of f}ew projects to 
CMP at prices competitive with the Hydro Quebec proposal. Responses from a 
similar request for proposals for conservation projects are under evaluation, 
with further rounds of conservation bidding planned for 1988. 
STATEWIDE ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
Cost of Replacement Power 
The uncert~inties of relative energy prices render precise rate impact 
comparisons among replacement power alternatives impossible. Electricity 
pricing is. very complex and depends on many highly variable and 
unpredictable factors. Construction costs, long-term fuel prices, energy 
technology, the success of cost-effective conservation projects, and the pricing 
policies of the Public Utilities Cof'Tlmission all influence the price of new electric 
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capacity. As a result, it is impossible to predict accurately how the price of 
power from a particular source will change over time. 
Given the attention afforded the current Hydro Quebec proposal, and its 
already appreciable influence on the potential price of new in-state power12 , 
this analysis assumes that new Hydro Quebec power will be included in the mix 
of replacement power under the terms of the February 11, 1987 Letter of Intent. 
This is not to pass judgment on the merits of this proposal. In fact, alternative 
energy sources may be priced somewhat below or somewhat above the current 
Hydro Quebec price. 
To estimate replacement power costs, utility revenue requirements both 
with and without Maine Yankee are projected for the next 30 years. It is 
assumed that in the case of a shutdown, the plant would be closed sometime in 
1988.13 Meaningful analysis of replacement power costs requires further 
assumptions r~garding future energy supply and demand conditions. The 
approach taken here has been to adopt typical current planning assumptions 
for each of Maine's three largest utilities. Specifically: 
• power to replace Maine Yankee is assumed to come from a 
combination of conventional sources, including renovation of 
existing plant, expanded power purchased from domestic and 
Canadian sources, and increased results from conservation and 
load management programs; 
• fuel price escalation rates and capacity costs are the same as 
those assumed by CMP in its recent analysis of the Hydro Quebec 
purchase option; 
12The recent agreement between CMP and Boise Cascade for the construction of a 75 MW 
wood/coal fired cogeneration system in Rumford was priced at a discount below the Hydro 
Quebec price, reported at 4o/o. In addition, industrial firms and independent power producers in 
Maine had proposed over 1400 MW of projects to CMP at prices competitive with the Hydro 
Quebec proposal. · 
13use of this date incorportates into the analysis at least a portion of the "temporary taking" costs 
required by the recent First Lutheran decision, compared with use of a later date, such as 1992. 
• 
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while the aging of the nuclear plant at Wiscasset will likely reduce 
its annual output as maintenance shutdowns become more 
frequent, for simplicity it is assumed here that Maine Yankee 
would continue to provide an average of about 840 MW annually 
for the rest of its planned operating life. If so, 420 additional MW 
would be needed to replace Maine Yankee power consumed in 
Maine. 
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 1. Replacing Maine 
Yankee power could raise energy costs in Maine by $50 to $60 million per year 
between 1989 and 1993, as indicated. This would rise to between $60 and 
$100 million per year after 1993, due to the costs of developing new long-term 
capacity. After 2008, the cost situation would reverse as a result of what are 
called "end effects". 
Table 1 
REPLACEMENT POWER COSTS OF A MANDATORY SHUTDOWN 
OF MAINE YANKEE 
Replacement Power Cost 
(Millions 1986$ ) 
1989-1992 
1989-2008 
1989-2015 
(Present Value in 1989*) 
1989-2008 
1989-2015 
* 4.3 % real discount rate 
TOTAL 
229.6 
1540.0 
984.0 
984.0 
779.0 
167.3 
1123.0 
732.0 
719.0 
573.0 
41.3 
248.0 
150.0 
160.0 
125.0 
21.0 
168.0 
102.0 
105.0 
80.0 
These end effects are the result of incurring the costs to replace Maine 
Yankee earlier than would be the case if the plant ran through its license period. 
Without a shutdown, Maine Yankee would have to be replaced in the year 2008 
when its operating license expires. By replacing the facility earlier, these costs 
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are accelerated in time. The result of these end effects would be to reduce 
energy costs by $50 to $120 million per year between 2009 and 2015. 
Assuming that consumer electricity purchases maintain proportions 
roughly similar to 1986, these costs would be distributed between residential, 
commercial, and industrial consumers as shown in Figure 1.14 
$120 
$100 
$80 
MILLIONS 
($86) S6o 
r-o$40 
$20 
$0 
Fi ure 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF REPLACEMENT ENERGY COSTS 
1989-2008 
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
These replacement power costs imply an overall increase in average 
electric rates in Maine on the order of 5 to 1 0°/o between 1989 and 2008, with a 
corresponding decrease for several years thereafter, as a result of the end 
effects. 
14 Based on proportion of sales revenue by customer class for CMP, Bangor Hydro Electric, and 
Maine Public Service combined. These proportions are: residential--43°/o; commercial--27o/o: and 
industrial--30%,. As noted earlier, Maine's utilities project increases in power costs over the next 
five years for other reasons. It is not clear whether these increases will provoke major industrial 
customers to reduce their purchases of electricity by generating power themselves. If such 
reductions occur, the shutdown impact for residential customers will be significantly greater than 
shown in Figure 1. 
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The actual rate effects of replacement power costs would vary around the 
State, depending on local utility dependence on Maine Yankee. The greatest 
rate impact would be felt in the Maine Public Service service area, primarily 
Arrostook County, followed by the service areas of Bangor Hydro Electric, and 
Central Maine Power. The impacts of these effects on Maine's regions are 
discussed below, and illustrated in Figure 2, and Table 3. 
Compensation to Out-of-State Owners 
The legal issues surrounding compensation to out-of-state owners of 
Maine Yankee are discussed in some detail in Section 1. As noted, the amount 
of compensation owed to out-of-state owners will be determined only after what 
is likely to be a p·rotracted legal debate. This analysis benefits by no more 
precise indication of the amount of such compensation than did the 1986 report. 
That analysis estimated compensation at between $120 million and $3.4 billion. 
As discussed in the legal analysis, it does not appear that any compensation 
due the owners could be less than the current net book value of the facility 
which is $209,339,000; in the case of out-of-state owners, compensation would 
be one-half the determined amount. For this analysis, we have used the cost of 
replacement power measure to determine compensation. We have computed 
this to be $984 million (see Table 3), or approximately $1 billion, for in-state 
owners and oave used this figure for compensation to out-of-state owners as , 
we11.1s 
As also noted in Section 1, it is likely that if Maine Yankee is closed 
temporarily, prior to a successful appeal, the owners would be awarded 
compensation for the period of this "temporary taking". The amount of this 
temporary compensation is not explicitly incorporated here (see footnote 12). 
To illustrate the impact on the Maine economy of this $1 billion obligation 
to out-of-state owners, we have used a compensation schedule which assumes 
that this judgment is paid through a $1 billion bond issue over the balance of 
15 This could be a conservative estimate since out-of-state owners are not likely to have access to 
as inexpensive sources of power as biomass· and Hydro Quebec as do the in-state owners. 
Without such access, the cost of replacement power will be as much as 20-30o/o higher. 
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the license period of the plant (20 years). At an interest rate of 8%,,16 this would 
require level payments of $101 ,852,000 each year from the General Fund. 
Collection of this revenue is assumed to be achieved through an increase in 
personal income taxes. The estimated impacts of these payments are 
discussed below. 
Income and Employment Impacts of a Mandated Shutdown 
Higher electricity costs can affect jobs in two ways. For commercial and 
industrial consumers, higher electricity costs can harm the competitive position 
of Maine firms in comparison with other states or countries. With higher 
production costs, these firms will be unable to capture larger, or maintain their 
existing, shares of their markets, thereby forcing a reduction in employment. 
This will be especially true for those firms which cannot produce their own 
electricity. 
For residential consumers, higher electricity prices reduce the amount of 
disposable income available to support consumption. This reduced 
consumption, in turn, eliminates jobs throughout the economy but especially in 
retail trade and other service sectors. Income lost to compensating out,.of-state 
owners affects the economy in the same way. In addition, the drain of income 
out of the State, as would occur in the case of compensation payments, reduces 
the amount of capital available for investment in Maine businesses. 
On the other side of the equation are the income and employment 
additions associated with new domestic power production. While it is not at all 
certain that Maine Yankee power would be replaced by power produced in the 
State, Maine's nascent independent power industry has already seen 
significant growth. The need for long-term power to replace Maine Yankee 
could provide additional impetus for the development of this industry in Maine. 
16 This is somewhat below the 30-Year Treasury Bill discount rate as an estimate of the cost of 
capital to Maine for a 20-year bond issue. The actual rate could be lower since state debt could be 
issued as tax exempt. Alternatively, such a large pubic issue could adversely affect Maine's 
creditworthiness, forcing a higher interest rate. 
1 9 
Cogeneration facilities at paper mills, along with free-standing wood-chip 
and municipal waste generation plants have emerged as a major source of 
electricity supply in Maine, rising from less than 1 °/o of CMP's supply in 1975 to 
approximately 15o/o today. By 1990, these types of plants are expected to 
provide 30°/o to 40°/o of CMP's supply. It is anticipated that replacement power 
needs from an early shutdown of Maine Yankee would result in the construction 
of more cogeneration and independent power facilities in Maine.17 
The income and employment impacts of higher energy prices and 
compensation payments on the Maine economy were estimated using the 
Maine Policy Analysis Model (MEPAM). Those impacts resulting from 
expanded domestic power production were drawn from the recent analysis of 
the Hydro Quebec proposa1.1a That analysis estimated the income and 
employment impacts of 600 MW of domestic power capacity. For this analysis, 
we have scaled down those impacts to reflect the need for only 420 MW to 
replace Maine Yankee, all of which was assur:ned to be produced within Maine. 
The income and employment impacts are presented in Table 2. 
Employment impacts are presented for two time-periods-1989 through 1992; 
and from 1993 to 2008- and are expressed as the average per-year impact 
over each period. Income impacts are presented over the full period 1989 to 
2008 and expressed as a present value in 1986 dollars. The net impacts of a 
mandatory shutdown, as presented here, are the sum of the effects of higher 
electricity costs and the compensation due out-of-state owners plus the positive 
impacts due to domestic production. 
As shown in the table, a mandatory shutdown of Maine Yankee could 
cost the citizens of Maine $1.38 billion over the twenty year period from 1989-
-2008. This figure represents the present value of the income impacts of the 
17 Additional jobs would also be generated through energy conservation programs. We do not 
have good data to estimate the potential of such job creation and thus have not included it in our 
analysis. 
18 Preliminary Report on the Effects of the Proposed Purchase of Power from Hydro Quebec, 
State Planning Office, May 1987. 
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replacement power costs, payments to out-of-state owners, and domestic power 
production. 
Table 2 
SUMMARY OF STATEWIDE ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
OF A 1988 RETIREMENT OF MAINE YANKEE 
INCOME IMPACTS 
(Present Value, 1986 $) 
Replacement Power 
Compensation Payments 
Maine Yankee Facility 
(Direct & Indirect) 
Domestic Production* 
(Direct & Indirect) 
Net lrrpact 
EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS 
{Average Annual Job Loss/Gain) 
Replacement Power 
Compensation Payments 
Maine Yankee Facility 
(Direct & Indirect) 
Domestic Production* 
(Direct & Indirect) 
Net lrrpact 
1989-1992 
-650 
-1500 
-1300 
700 
-3500 
1989-2008 
-$496 Million 
-$1 ,311 Million 
-$146 Million 
$575 Million 
-$1,378 Million 
1993-2008 
-930 
-700 
-1300 
1600 
-1390 
* Assumes that all of the replacement power (420 MW) is generated by facilities within the State of 
Maine. To the degree that this is not the case, e.g., Hydro Quebec supplies some of the 
replacement power, these numbers should be reduced proportionately. 
Interestingly, the employment consequences of a mandatory shutdown 
are less severe than one might expect in light of the significant income impact. 
The replacement of Maine Yankee with domestic generation is itself an 
employment generator. This occurs primarily through construction of new 
facilities in the early years, and in the later years through harvesting and 
transporting biomass fuel and operating the new facilities. These new jobs 
2 1 
offset some of the employment losses associated with the higher costs of 
replacement power and compensation payments. However, it is important to 
note that these gains result only if replacement power is provided by in-state 
facilities. 
REGIONAL IMPACTS 
Regional economic impacts of an early shutdown of Maine Yankee 
would vary across the State. The rate impact of more expensive replacement 
power would vary by the level of dependence on Maine Yankee power and the 
location of energy-intensive businesses. Rates in Aroostook County would be 
most affected, because that region relies more heavily on Maine Yankee power 
than the rest of the State (45°/o in Maine Public Service territory compared to 
22°/o Statewide). This heavier rate effect is of special significance to the 
Aroostook County economy where food processing, and paper production-
electricity-intensive industries-play such a large role. Moreover, such a large 
rate impact would represent a significant cost increase, beyond increase 
projected to occur over the next twenty years, to all electricity consumers, 
especially small businesses, and low-income individuals. 
The rate impacts for each of Central Maine Power, Bangor Hydro Electric, 
and Maine Public Service are illustrated in Figure 2, and shown in Table 3. The 
figures in this graph are uneven because of the timing and type of new capacity 
additions in each utility's hypothesized 30-year generation expansion plans. It 
should be noted that the graph in Figure 2 exhibits changes in average rates 
and ll.Q1 necessarily the retail rates established by the Public Utilities 
Commission. As was noted, Maine Public Service, and hence Aroostock 
County, is most vulnerable to the economic effects of a mandatory shutdown, as 
increases in electricity will reach as high as 20o/o by 2006. In contrast, the larger 
size and lower dependency on Maine Yankee of both BHE and CMP serve to 
moderate the rate impacts of an early shutdown, keeping them within the 5 to 
9o/o range. 
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The Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company provides about 290 full-time 
jobs. In addition, it is estimated that operation of the facility supports an 
additional 1000-1500 jobs around the State, including those related to 
maintenance during temporary shutdowns. Obviously, these jobs are 
concentrated in and around Wiscasset. Thus, an early shutdown would have a 
severe impact on the Town of Wiscasset and vicinity, reducing the Maine 
Yankee workforce to a skeleton crew and drastically reducing its contribution to 
the property tax base. It is important to note that these effects will occur in 2008 
in any case. However, such a precipitous closing would prevent the area from 
taking any meaningful mitigating actions. 
The distribution of economic benefits of additional domestic power 
production an early shutdown of Maine Yankee would also vary. Direct 
economic impacts will depend on the location of new power production 
facilities and on the location of fuel resources and available transmission lines. 
It is reasonable to expect these plants to locate primarily in northern, western, 
and eastern Maine~ as these regions contain the bulk of Maine's wood and peat 
resources. Moreover, the majority of recent biomass power purchase 
agreements and proposed biomass facilities are located in eastern, central, and 
northern Maine. 
Employment and income benefits of conservation projects are likely to be 
distributed around the State, but concentrated in Southern Maine. The indirect 
economic impacts of new domestic power production will also be more 
dispersed around the State. 
DECOMMISSIONING COSTS 
The 1986 Maine Yankee Shutdown Assessment estimated costs of 
$200,000,000 (in 1986 dollars) for dismantling and full decommissioning of the 
plant. Current industry estimates for decommissioning a plant such as Maine 
Yankee would likely be in the range of $190,000,000 to $210,000,000. This cost 
must be incurred at some time, regardless of the outcome of the referendum. 
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Some uncertainties persist in the factors which comprise 
decommissioning cost analyses, however. The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission has, yet to release its revised Decommissioning Criteria for 
Nuclear Facilities, which were initially proposed in February, 1985. The State's 
future situation with respect to the January 1, 1993 deadline of the Low Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Act (when the State must assume direct responsibility 
for all low-level waste in Maine) is uncertain. The future readiness of DOE to 
accept high-level waste shipments in 1998 remains questionable. Finally, 
Maine law, 35-A M.R.S.A. Subsection 4356 (6), provides that "assurance is 
needed that funds will be available for the cost of decommissioning which 
would occur if a nuclear power plant is prematurely closed," and 35-A M. R.S.A. 
Subsection 4356 (3) provides that if the Decommissioning Trust Fund is 
insufficient to decommission the plant, the licensee would be responsible for the 
deficiency. If the Company were unable to provide the full amount, the statute 
provides that owners would be jointly and severally responsible for the 
balance19. 
19 A number of resource documents, representing a wide range of Maine Y~nkee 
decommissioning topics, has been compiled and is available at the Public Utilities Commission 
Information Resource Center. 
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4. HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
The principle benefit of an early shutdown of Maine Yankee is the 
elimination of the risk of a catastrophic operations accident at that facility·. The 
April, 1986 accident at the Soviet Union's Chernobyl-4 nuclear power station 
has heightened public concerns regarding the safety of nuclear power in 
general. A secondary benefit is the cessation of the production of low-level 
nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel the Wiscasset facility. 
Closing Maine Yankee eliminates the threats associated with an 
operating nuclear plant. Those associated with decommissioning and waste 
disposal remain, however. Moreover, sources of replacement power will, 
themselves, have significant environmental and health impacts. 
OPERATIONAL SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES* 
Throughout their life, American nuclear reactors release very small 
amounts of radioactivity which cause few adverse health impacts. The 
.operating history of nuclear plants in the United States to date indicates to many 
that the risk of a serious nuclear accident is extremely small. 
. If a catastrophic accident were to occur, however, it would have lasting 
impacts on public health and safety, the environment and the economy. The 
most severe nuclear accident reported to date was the April, 1986 accident at 
the Chernobyl-4 nuclear power station in the Soviet Ukraine. That accident 
released over 100 million curies of radiation into the environment, resulted in 
the deaths of 33 workers and firemen, and may be a principal cause of many 
future radiation-related deaths. The Chernobyl accident required an evacuation 
of the population within 18 miles of the plant and over 50 miles downwind, 
dislocating 135,000 people. Soviet reports indicate that the area around 
Chernobyl will be uninhabitable for 4 years. The long-term effects of this 
* For more detail regarding safety aspects of nuclear plant operation, see appendix. 
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radioactive contamination on the people, food chain, environment, and 
economy of the Chernobyl area or the Soviet Ukraine are still under 
examination and beyond the scope of current measurement. 
Aspects of the Chernobyl Accident 
In the past year, exhaustive studies of the April, 1986, accident at the 
Soviet Union's Chernobyl-4 nuclear power station have been conducted. The 
international scientific community continues its efforts to identify lessons from 
that accident for improving nuclear plant safety. Conclusions which have been 
drawn are similar, but recommendations based on those conclusions vary 
widely. 
As the Soviet report, prepared for the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, stated: 
"The accident at Chernobyl was the result of coincidences of 
several events of low probability."20 
Most published assessments concur with that statement, and go on to 
attribute specific causes of the accident primarily to the design of the Soviet 
reactor and to operator and procedural error. 
System Design 
The accident at Chernobyl-4 involved a Soviet-designed high-power, 
graphite-moderated boiling-water-cooled reactor, identified as the RBMK-1 000 
system. According to a compendium of U.S. assessments, this uniquely Soviet 
design evolved from early demonstration and plutonium production reactors. 
General characteristics of the RBMK and its predecessors include the use of 
graphite as a neutron moderator arid light water as the coolant. Pressure tubes, 
20 "The Accident at the Chernobyl' AES and its Consequences", U.S.S.R. State Committee for 
the Utilization of Atomic Energy. August. 1986. 
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contained in vertical channels in the graphite, either contain low-enriched 
uranium oxide fuel or are used as locations for control rods and instrumentation. 
The use of boiling water as a coolant in a pressure-tube, graphite-moderated 
reactor distinguishes the RBMK design from any other reactor design. 
Operator and Procedural Error 
Chronologies of the Chernobyl-4 acci·dent reveal a number of operator 
and procedural errors that contributed to the accident, which occurred during 
the performance of a turbine generator test. The test procedures had not been 
adequately reviewed for safety. Management control of the performance of the 
test was not maintained, the test procedure was not followed, safety systems 
were bypassed, and control rods were operated incorrectly. Operators lost 
control of the reactor during the performance of the test. 
Information available indicates that Chernobyl Unit 4 was one of the best 
of the 14 operating RBMK- 1000 units. The training and experience of the 
operating crew may have focused mainly on steady-state operation since the 
reactor operated continually as a base-loaded unit with on-line refueling. 
Evidently, there was very little, if any, training conducted on a plant simulator. 
Only one simulator at another site has been mentioned as possibly serving the 
training needs of operators of all 14 RBMK units. 
The U.S. review concluded that the previous excellent performance 
created an attitude in plant personnel that close adherence to procedures was 
unnecessary; in effect, the previous trouble-free operation led to a dominating 
overconfidence. 
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An Industry View 
The Atomic Industrial Forum, which refers to itself as "the association of 
the nuclear industry," stated in an annual overview of the state of that industry:21 
Chernobyl was the ultimate civilian nuclear disaster: It 
resulted in total destruction of a power reactor, widespread 
distribution of radioactive materials over a broad area of the globe, 
prompt fatalities, and the possibility of future health effects. The 
accident raised questions in the minds of public officials, and 
triggered a review of emergency procedures as well as a new look 
at some U.S. containment systems. In many countries, including the 
United States, Chernobyl was cited by some as a reason to close or 
delay startup of nuclear power plants. 
AIF concluded, however, that "both the design characteristics of the 
Chernobyl-type reactor and the procedures followed by its operators combined · 
to create a situation that would not be duplicated anywhere else in the world." 
The AIF statement continued by quoting the Association's President, Carl 
Walske: 
"Chernobyl enters the history books as the accident that proved the basic 
correctness of nuclear power design and operating decisions made in 
the West more than two decades ago. The major lessons of Chernobyl 
are to be learned by the Soviets." 
Implications of the Chernobyl Accident 
Conclusions drawn about causes of the accident at Chernobyl-4 in April, 
1986, point to system design inadequacies, management breakdown, operator 
errors, procedural and training deficiencies, and equipment failures. 
Compounding factors were inattentiveness, low levels of diligence, and 
21 "The Nuclear Industry in 1986: A Year of Incongruities", Info News Release. Atomic Industrial 
Forum, Inc., December 12, 1986. 
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overconfidence by responsible personnel, who tended to trust previous 
experience rather than carefully-developed procedure. Additionally, the 
simultaneous occurrence of a number of these factors was unanticipated or 
unforeseen in the development of planning scenarios on which Chernobyl-4 
operations were based. 
The conceptual problems stated above have some parallel outside the 
Chernobyl-4 experience. For example, the following inadequacies were 
identified in an Inspection and Enforcement investigation of the Three Mile 
Island 2 accident of March, 1979:22 
Perhaps the most disturbing result of the IE investigation is 
confirmation of earlier conclusions that the Three Mile Island Unit 2 
accident could have been prevented, in spite of the inadequacies 
listed. The design of the plant, the equipment that was installed, the 
various accident and transient analyses, and the emergency 
procedures were adequate to have prevent~d the serious 
consequences of the accident, if they had been permitted to function 
or be carried out as planned ... The results of the investigation make 
it difficult to fault only the actions of the operating staff. There is 
considerable evidence of a "mind set," not only by TMI operators but 
by operators at other plants as well, that overfilling the reactor 
coolant system (making the system solid) was to be avoided at 
almost any cost. Undue attention by the TMI operators to avoiding a 
solid system led them to ignore other procedural instruction and 
indications that the core was not being properly cooled. Without this 
"mind set" they might well have acted to preclude or better mitigate 
the accident. 
The accidents at Chernobyl-4 and Three Mile Island 2 cannot be 
dismissed as totally unrelated. Clearly evident in reports of both of these 
incidents is the recurrence of the same generic operations failures, 
22 Investigation into the March 29, 1979, Three Mile Island Accident by Office of Inspection and 
Enforcement", Investigative Report No. 50-320/79-10, NUREG-0600, U.S. NRC, August. 1979. 
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accompanied by recommendations and cautions that these failures be 
addressed in future operations throughout the power industries. 
Federal Preemption 
One complication of the extension of experience, or "lessons learned", to 
. improve safety or efficiency at nuclear power stations is federal preemption, 
which in some critical areas removes state officials from direct jurisdiction over, 
or perhaps even knowledge of, safety matters. A former Maine Chairman of the 
Public Utiliites Commission, who was a member of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission during the Three Mile Island 2 incident, has described this 
dilemma:23 
"The consequences of the preemption of the states from nuclear 
safety decision-making came home to roost in the aftermath of 
Three Mile Island. . .. At the point at which the federal regulators and 
the utility were confounded by puzzling and dangerous events, 
[Pennsylvania's] Governor Thornburgh was called upon to make the 
first nuclear power plant safety decision ever entrusted to a state 
official- whether or not to evacuate the surrounding population." 
In this respect it may be noted that the Maine Legislature recently 
enacted legislation creating a State program for the monitoring of safety at 
Maine Yankee. P.L. 1987, c. 519 (AN ACT To Establish a State Nuclear Safety 
Inspection and Monitoring Program for Commercial Nuclear Power Facilities in 
the State). 
23 Address by Peter A. Bradford, Chairman, Maine Public Utilities Commission, to the Nuclear 
Plant Safety and Reliability Seminar, Valley Forge, PA. January 22, 1987. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF CLOSING MAINE YANKEE 
Decommissioning and Nuclear Waste Disposal 
As noted in the 1986 report, final dismantling of Maine Yankee will 
involve the handling of large amounts of radioactive waste. The NRC currently 
recognizes three decommissioning methods - complete dismantling and 
removal, in-place encapsulation ("entombment" and mothballing), or a 
combination of these methods. Maine Yankee currently proposes to use the 
complete dismantling and removal method. However, uncertainties persist as 
to the future readiness of U.S. D.O. E. to accept high-level waste shipments, and 
to Maine's future responsibility for low-level waste produced in the State. 
As a result of these uncertainties, the timing of any Maine Yankee 
decommissioning, which of necessity must await sites for low-level and high-
level waste, is difficult to project. Indeed, Maine Yankee may become an interim 
high-level waste and spent fuel repository, as well as a low-level waste site, for 
an indefinite period, depending on developments in these areas and the effect 
of 35-A M.R.S.A. Subsection 4371 (discussed earlier). Although not a preferred 
or even desirable method, long term on-site waste management has been 
reviewed by Maine Yankee. If this occurs, it will happen irrespective of the 
referendum's outcome, since Maine Yankee's high-level waste must be 
disposed of. 
Industry experience is rapidly evolving and is scheduled for review in an 
International Decommissioning Symposium in October. This session, 
sponsored by DOE, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Nuclear 
Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, is a follow-up to a DOE symposium in 1982. 
Impacts of Replacement Power 
Replacing power from Maine Yankee will also entail a range of 
environmental and health impacts. Importation of Canadian power from Hydro 
Quebec will require the construction of a large high-voltage transmission line 
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from the Quebec border to CMP facilities in Maine. The construction of a 
transmission line through western Maine presents several environmental issues 
including soil erosion, impacts on fish and wildlife habitat, existing land uses, 
recreation, water quality, and scenic quality. 
In addition, operating alternating current (AC) lines have raised 
questions about potential impacts on human health and welfare. Concerns 
have been raised in other states about the health risks of extremely low 
frequency (ELF) fields associated with AC power lines. To date, analyses on 
this health effect are inconclusive.24 
Constructing and operating several small power plants and hydro 
facilities will have significant environmental consequences, as well. Among 
these are the impacts of transmission line siting, air emissions, biomass 
harvesting, disposal of ash, and damming of rivers. 
Biomass fired power plants consume large quantities of biomass and 
process water, and generate ash and various air pollutants. Resource 
consumption, ash generation, and air emissions will vary with the size of the 
plant and the particular fuel mix burned. The use of significant amounts of coal 
or oil would require environmental controls to reduce the sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxide emissions to allowable levels. However, substitution of biomass 
for oil may reduce some of the emissions, as is the case with the Boise-
Cascade cogeneration facility in Rumford. 
These impacts and other plant construction, operation, and siting 
considerations raise numerous environmental issues. Of special note is the fact 
that coal and municipal waste ash, unlike wood and peat, contain heavy metals, 
which may reduce available disposal options. 
The total wood biomass harvest needed to fuel these plants is 
approximately 4 million tons per year. This will come from a combination of 
sawmill residues, the limbs and tops of trees cut for pulp or sawlogs, and whole 
24 For more details, see Preliminary Report on the Effects of the Proposed Purchase of Power 
from Hydro Quebec. Maine State Planning Office. May, 1987. 
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trees cut exclusively for fuel (these trees are usually cut in the same area as 
trees for sawlogs and pulp in order to minimize yarding and transportation 
costs}. These amounts would be in addition to any currently-contracted biomass 
or cogeneration facilities. Best estimates are that this additional demand would 
approximately double existing whole-tree harvest activities. 
Current and planned demand for wood from Maine's forests is still being 
examined by the Department of Conservation and others. Until these studies 
are complete, it is impossible to be certain what the impacts of additional whole 
tree harvesting will be. However, it is possible that the additional demand from 
these biomass plants could cause demand to exceed growth, and, absent any 
efforts to increase the yield of our forests, could result in depletion of the 
resource over a long period of time. It is more likely, however, that increased 
demand would stimulate efforts at increasing supply. 
Whole tree harvesting is thought by some to have potentially harmful 
effects on the surrounding ecosystem. Of major concern is the potential for 
depletion of nutrients from the forest soil due to the removal of large quantities 
of biomass that would otherwise naturally decompose and restore nutrients to 
the soil. There is also concern that there would be adverse impacts from 
improper harvesting practices on wildlife population and habitat (especially 
from clearcut operations} damage to trees left on the site, or damage to the site 
itself. However, many forestry experts believe that these adverse impacts can 
be mitigated. What will be more difficult to mitigate will be the creation of access 
roads and other lumbering infrastructure which will result from a doubling of 
present harvest levels. 
Peat use as a biomass fuel raises unique environmental concerns. 
Unlike wood, peat is a non-renewable resource. Efforts are now underway to 
inventory the many peat bogs in Maine to determine those that contain unique 
natural occurrences which may require special protection. Maine's first peat-
fired power plant is currently under construction in Washington County. This 24 
MW facility will burn up to 164,000 tons of peat per year. Wood chips will be 
used to supplement the peat fuel. A closed loop cooling water system which 
extracts water from the peat itself will minimize water supply needs. Exhaust 
heat from the boilers and steam turbines will be used to dry the peat during 
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processing and storage. Up to 5,000 tons of peat ash will be generated on an 
annual basis. 
Hydropower projects use the potential energy of falling water as an 
indigenous and renewable source of electric power generation. Generally 
speaking, hydropower projects do not discharge "pollutants" to the air, land, or 
water. However, hydro projects can significantly affect various public resources, 
and numerous environmental issues related to the construction, operation, and 
siting of these facilities are raised and addressed in the permitting process. 
It is not clear how viable new hydropower is in Maine. Surveys of 
existing and potential hydroelectric sites indicates that significant hydro 
potential exists. However, recent responses to CMP requests for power 
purchase proposals, however, included only 1 MW of hydroelectric power. This 
would seem to indicate that new hydro in Maine is simply not competitive with 
fossil fuel alternatives, and certainly not with Hydro Quebec. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Comparing the risk and consequences of a catastophic nuclear accident 
against the economics of increased energy costs presents a formidable 
challenge. A 1982 report conducted for the Nuclear Referendum Committee 
stated: 
"On the one side of the debate ... are those who emphasize risks and 
uncertainties of continued nuclear operation. But it is difficult to 
persuasively quantify the probabilities and the human and economic 
impacts of catastrophic events ... nuclear risks versus nuclear 
substitution economics-cannot at this time be recast into a common 
measure and compared with one another in a noncontroversial social 
cost/benefit assessment. .. ln defining positions on the plant shutdown 
issue, quantitative analysis will continue to be supplemented by 
subjective perceptions and nomative judgments ... "25 
Quantifying the economic costs and benefits of an early shutdown, as 
provided in Section 3, is an effort to put this complex issue into perspective. The 
actual costs of replacing Maine Yankee could vary considerably from the figures 
provided here. Of particular importance to the costs of replacing Maine Yankee 
are 1) the price of replacement power, which, over the short term, will vary 
directly with the price of oil and, which, over the long term, may or may not be 
priced competitively with the Hydro Quebec proposal, 2) the actual cost of 
operating Maine Yankee over the next 20 years, and in particular its power 
output, as the plant ages, and 3) the basis upon which the owners of the facility 
will be compensated, if compensation is required. 
Whatever the actual costs of replacing Maine Yankee power, certain 
things are clear. First, replacing Maine Yankee with other sources of generation 
will come at a high cost to Maine ratepayers. Instead of being used to displace 
expensive and unstable oil-fired generation, these sources will replace less 
25 "The Impacts of Early Retirement of Nuclear Power Plants: The Case of Maine Yankee", 
Raskin, P.O.; Rosen, A.A.; Energy Systems Research Group. August, 1982. p.2. 
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expensive nuclear power, and, at least in the short term, increase the State's 
vulnerability to the vagaries of international petroleum markets. 
Second, the outcome of the referendum will have no impact on the 
selection of Maine as a high-level nuclear waste site. As noted in the 1986 
! 
report to Governor Joseph Brennan, there is a tenuous connection, if any, 
between the production of nuclear waste at Maine Yankee and Maine's 
selection by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) as a potential high-level 
waste site. Further, Congressional approval of a Senate measure limiting the 
number of high-level nuclear waste sites to one, would remove the threat that 
Maine will become a high-level waste site. This bill would not eliminate the 
issue of nuclear waste disposal, only the threat that Maine will be selected by 
DOE. 
Third, the outcome of the referendum will not change Maine's 
responsibility for low-level nuclear waste. Under the Low Level Nuclear Waste 
Policy Act of 1980, as amended, all states must take responsibility for the 
disposal of low-level nuclear waste generated in the state by 1993. In 1987, 
through the work of the Maine Advisory Commission on Radioactive Waste, the 
Maine Low-Level Radioactive Waste Authority was established to meet our 
federal requirements. The Commission and the new authority are seeking 
arrangements for out-of-state waste disposal. If it is unable to make suitable 
arrangements, the Authority must develop an in-state low-level nuclear waste 
facility. Building any such facility in Maine is expected to cost up to $10 million. 
Funds to pjan and build a disposal facility are to be raised through an 
assessment against Maine Yankee between 1988 and 1992. While the cost of 
out-of-state disposal is unknown at this writing, it is expected to be less than the 
costs of an in-state facility. 
According to a survey conducted by the Department of Environmental 
Protection, Maine Yankee produces the bulk of the low-level nuclear waste 
shipped from Maine. Currently, many smaller generators of low-level waste in 
Maine store it on site until it has decayed to less dangerous levels. While an 
early shutdown of Maine Yankee will greatly reduce the amount of such waste 
generated in Maine, it is not clear how this would affect Maine's waste disposal 
needs in the late 1990s and beyond. This question is muddied by further 
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uncertainties, e.g., whether Maine can find an adequate out-of-state disposal 
option, how smaller waste generators dispose of future waste, and whether 
waste generated by Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is to be a State or federal 
responsibility. 
The numerous issues surrounding nuclear safety, and Maine's long term 
energy needs are as complex as they are compelling. Whatever its outcome, 
the 1987 referendum will touch the lives of every Maine citizen. It is crucial that 
a decision so critical to our future be based upon as clear an understanding of 
its consequences as possible, tempered by an appreciation for the great gaps 
in our knowledge and predictive powers. 
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John R. McKernan, Jr. Stephen G. Ward 
Public Advocate Governor 
TO: 
FROM: 
DATE: 
RE: 
Executive Department 
PUBLIC ADVOCATE 
Telephone (207) 289-2445 
Maine Yankee St~ Group 
Stephen G. Ward, Public Advocate 
September 17, 1987 
Maine Yankee Legal Analysis 
I am providing the legal analysis for the 1987 Study, with 
minor changes to the August 15 draft based on comments received from 
interested parties. 
A. Introduction 
Unlike prior referenda in Maine seeking the shutdown of Maine 
Yankee, the current proposal does not narrowly address the question 
of economic and safety consequences from continued plant operation; 
it also targets the risk of nuclear waste generation and the 
associated problems of disposal of high-level radioactive waste. 
Although in each case, current and prior referenda proposals have 
incorporated economic arguments for a Maine Yankee shutdown, the 
1987 referendum for the first time will broaden the scope of the 
debate to include high-level waste disposal, as well as the danger 
of operator error or plant malfunctions. 
In co~junction with DOE's review of in-state sites for a high-
level waste repository, these additional health and safety issues in 
State House Station 112, Augusta, Maine 04333 - Offices Located on 5th Floor, State Office Building 
the 1987 referendum debate will inevitably draw attention to a 
central legal question: what authority exists under current federal 
and state law for Maine to order a nuclear plant shutdown on grounds 
including the public health and safety? Although this issue was 
1 
examined in the Governor's 1986 Maine Yankee shutdown assessment, 
it deserves reexamination in light of several recent United States 
Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the issues of federal pre-
emption and just compensation for a forced closure of Maine Yankee. 
This section of this 1987 report will examine the central 
question of state authority to compel a Maine Yankee shutdown and 
then will turn to the subsidiary questions of fair compensation to 
the plant's owners in the event that the state does possess such 
authority. 
B. Preemption 
In a government of laws, such as ours, the enactment of a state 
law will be assessed in terms of its potential for conflict with 
existing federal law, under established court precedents. One of 
the primary tests which a newly-enacted state law must pass is to 
demonstrate that it does not violate any provision of the federal 
1 
The "Staff Papers and Correspondence" appendix to the 
previous State Planning Office May, 1986 report includes an April 
2, 1986 letter from the Attorney General's office which commented 
that ''to the extent that state action is not motivated by safety 
or technological considerations of a nuclear power pl~nt, it will 
not be preempted by the Atomic Energy Act", concluding that the 
U. S. Supreme Court's application of the preemption doctrine 
"will occur on a case-by-case basis". 
2 
constitution. The 1987 Maine Yankee referendum raises questions in 
several areas regarding possible conflicts with the United States 
2 
constitution and in particular the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce 
3 4 
clause, and the Contract Clause. In the latter case, parallel 
questions may arise under related provisions of the Maine 
Constitution. 
When a state law or regulation introduces inconsistent 
requirements in an area already subject to federal legislation, the 
federal courts evaluate the necessity of preempting the state law 
under the long-lived doctrine of federal preemption. The United 
5 
States Supreme Court recently provided a summary of this doctrine: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
"The Supremacy Clause of Art. VI of the 
Constitution provides Congress with the power to pre-
empt state law. Pre-emption occurs when Congress, in 
enacting a federal statute, expresses a clear intent to 
pre-empt state law, Jones~ Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 
519 (1977), when there is outright or actual conflict 
between federal and state law, e.g., Free v. Bland, 369 
U.S. 663 (1962), where compliance with bot~federal and 
state law is in effect physically impossible, Florida 
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 
(1963), where there is implicit in federal law a 
barrier to state regulation, Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 
Ince, 463 u.s. 85 (1983), where Congress has legislated 
comprehensively, thus occupying an entire field of 
Article IV: "This Constitution, and the laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be 
the supreme law of the Land". 
Article I, Section 8: "The Congress shall have Power ... to 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
States, and with Indian tribes". 
Article I, Section 10: "No State shall ... pass any ... law 
impairing the obligation of contracts". 
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC, 
slip. op. at 12, 5/27/86. 
3 
us 
-- --
regulation and leaving no room for the States to 
supplement federal law, Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 u.s. 218 (194~or-where the state law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full objectives of Congress. 
Hines~ Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). Pre-emption 
may result not only from action taken by Congress 
itself; a federal agency acting within the scope of its 
congressionally delegated authority may preempt state 
regulation. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. 
De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982); Capital Cities 
Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 u.s. 691 (1984)." 
In the context of the 1987 Maine Yankee referendum, there are a 
number of federal statutes which may conflict with, and conceivably 
preempt, a state law prohibiting the generation of high-level 
6 
nuclear waste. These include: the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
which conferred on the Atomic Energy Commission and, in 1974, its 
successor the Nuclear Regulatory Commission responsibility for 
licensing, monitoring and regulating "the construction or operation 
of any production or utilization facility" involving radiation 
7 
hazards; the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 which confers on the 
Department of Energy responsibility for locating, constructing and 
operating radioactive waste disposal facilities; and the Federal 
8 
Power Act which assigns to the Federal Energy Regulatory 
6 
7 
8 
42 USC 2011-2282, as amended in 1959 at 42 USC 2021 and in 
1974 by the Energy Reorganization Act at 42 USC 5801-5891. 
42 USC 10101 et ~· 
18 USC 824 et ~· Insofar as the Maine Yankee Atomic 
Power Company is subject to wholesale rate regulation by FERC in 
Washington, the forced closure of the plant under state law would 
presumably require FERC approval for an abandonment of service to 
wholesale customers, 35 of which are located in states other than 
Maine. 
4 
commission responsibility for regulating wholesale sales of 
electricity in interstate commerce. 
Courts both in Maine and elsewhere have evaluated federal 
preemption issues in the context of newly-enacted state laws. In 
Maine for example, a recent severance pay law in the case of 
manufacturing plant closings was recently upheld both by the Maine 
and United States Supreme Courts, notwithstanding issues of federal 
preemption. In both cases, the courts concluded that the federal 
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board did not preempt 
the Maine law, given state interests in preventing economic 
9 
dislocation due to plant closings. No Maine court to date has 
reviewed the question of state authority to regulate radioactive 
waste generation in the context of the three federal laws referred 
to earlier. 
In a number of federal and state courts elsewhere, however, 
this issue has received a close examination with the consistent 
result that such state authority has been found preempted and 
therefore unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. 
9 
Director of Bureau of Labor Standards v. Fort Halifax 
Packing Co., 510 A.2d 1054 (Me 1986), cert. den., ___ us ___ l987 but 
see Bayside Enterprises Inc. ~ Maine Agricultural Bargaining 
Board, 513 A.2d 1355 (Me 1986) where Maine law found preempted by 
the federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act. 
5 
Specific cases considering the generation or disposal of nuclear 
waste include: 
A. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
1. Northern States Power Co. v. State of Minnesota, 
447 F.2d 1143, 1154 (8th Cir., 1971): "Accordingly, 
for the reasons stated, we hold that the federal 
government has exclusive authority under the 
doctrine of preemption to regulate the 
construction and operation of nuclear power 
plants, which necessarily includes regulation of 
the levels of radioactive effluents discharged 
from the plant" (Minnesota emissions regulation, 
although more stringent than NRC regulation and 
therefore permitting dual compliance with both 
state and federal law, found preempted under the 
Atomic Energy Act); 
2. Train ~ Colorado Public Interest Research Group 
426 US 1, 15 (1975): Atomic Energy Commission 
retains "full authority to regulate materials 
covered by the [Atomic Energy Act], unaltered by 
the exercise of regulatory authority under the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act", citing 
Northern States Power Co. v. State of Minnesota as 
affirmed "summarily" by the u.s. Supreme Court at 
405 us 1035 (1972); 
3. United States ~City of New York, 643 FS 604, 612 
(SDNY, 1978): a city's attempt to prohibit 
operation of a university research reactor for 
safety reasons found preempted under 42 USC 2021 
due to the NRC's "radiological regulation of the 
operation of nuclear reactors"; 
4. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Board 
284 NE.2d 342 (Ill, 1972): Illinois statute 
regulating levels of radioactive discharges found 
preempted by the Atomic Energy Act in state 
court; 
6 
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5. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
v. Jersey Central Power and Light Co., 351 A.2d 337 
(NJ, 1976): New Jersey court finds state 
regulation of power plant emissions preempted by 
the Atomic Energy Act; 
6. People of the State of Illinois ~Kerr-McGee 
Chemical corp. 677 F.2d.571, 581 (7th Cir. 1981): 
"In line with the opinions in Northern States and 
Pacific Legal Foundation, we hold that the Atomic 
Energy Act has expressly and impliedly preempted 
regulation by the states of the radiation hazards 
associated with nuclear materials". 10 
B. Federal Power Act of 1935 
1. Mississippi Industries ~ FERC, 802 F.2d 1525 (DC 
Cir, 1987): a state challenge to FERC's 
reallocation of nuclear power plant costs among 
utilities in a holding company system is rejected 
due to FERC jurisdiction over sales of wholesale 
electricity in interstate commerce; 
2. State of Minnesota v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir, 
1984): Minnesota PUC challenge to a holding 
company cost sharing agreement is rejected due to 
FERC jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act; 
3. Nantahala Power and Light~ Thornburg, ____ us __ _ 
1986, 74 PUR 2.d 464, 465 (1986): "FERC's allocation 
of entitlement power to Nantahala is therefore 
reflected in Nantahala's filed [wholesale] rates. 
[The North Carolina Utilities Commission] 
Also see Brown~ Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 767 F.2d 134 
(7th Cir, 1985) where state authority over the movement of 
radioactive materials is found preempted under the Atomic Energy 
Act; a similar conclusion is possible in the case of state 
authority in the context of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. 
7 
cannot substitute its own conception of what 
allocation of entitlement power would have been 
memorialized in a fair Apportionment Agreement 
simply because FERC did not approve the 
Apportionment Agreement without qualification". 
4. Federal Power Commission v. Southern California 
Edison Co., 376 US 205, 2lS-16 (1964): 
" ... Congress meant to draw a bright line easily 
ascertained, between state and federal 
jurisdiction, making unnecessary such case-by-case 
analysis. This was done in the [Federal] Power 
Act by making the FPC's [now FERC] jurisdiction 
plenary and extending it to all wholesale sales in 
interstate commerce except those which Congress 
has made explicitly subject to regulation by the 
states". 
Based on these numerous precedents under two distinct theories of 
11 
federal preemption, there exists considerable doubt as to whether 
enactment of the 1987 Maine Yankee referendum could survive legal 
challenges in federal court. 
For the 1987 referendum to survive such challenges, the State 
of Maine will have to demonstrate that the forced closure of Maine 
Yankee does not frustrate achievement of Congress' full purposes and 
objectives in enacting the Federal Power Act, the Atomic Energy Act 
12 . 
or the Nuclear Waste Disposal Act. Nor that Congress has 
11 
12 
The theories can be stated: the Atomic Energy Act at 42 
USC 2018, 202l(c)(l) and 202l(K) preempts state regulation of 
nuclear power safety and radiation hazards; the Federal Power Act 
at Sections 205 and 206 preempts state regulation over wholesale 
sales of electricity in interstate commerce. 
See International Paper Co. v. Ouelette, US 
op. 1/21/87, 55 LW 4138, 414~(1987). 
, slip. 
8 
has demonstrated a "clear and manifest purpose" to supercede state 
13 
regulation. Finally, the State of Maine will have to demonstrate 
the possibility that Maine Yankee simultaneously can comply both 
with the newly-enacted state law and existing federal laws and 
14 
regulations. A recent u.s. Supreme Court case provides precedent 
for state regulation of nuclear power which is found not to be 
preempted by federal law, and therefore deserves specific mention. 
In Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources, 659 F.2d 
903 (9th Cir, 1981) a Federal Court of Appeals 'found that a 
California law imposing strict preconditions on the siting of new 
nuclear power plants in that state does not violate the Supremacy 
clause, on the grounds that "inherent in the state's regulatory 
authority is the power to keep [new] nuclear plants from being 
built" ... Id at 926. This decision was upheld by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. ~ State Energy Resources 
Commission, 461 US 190 (1983) with that court noting at several 
points that state authority over planning for new power plants and 
over ratemaking was not at issue. Id at 207, 209. However, the 
Supreme Court directly-and without dissenting opinions--addressed 
the issue of state regulation of nuclear safety and hazardous waste 
disposal: 
13 
See California Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Guerra, 
us , slip. op. 1/17/87, 55 LW 4077, 4082. 
14-- --
See Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. ~ Paul, 373 
us 132 (1963). 
9 
At the outset, we emphasize that the [California] 
statute does not seek to regulate the construction or 
operation of a nuclear power plant. It would clearly be 
impermissible for California to attempt to do so, for such 
regulation, even if enacted out of non-safety concerns, 
would nevertheless directly conflict with the NRC's 
exclusive authority over plant construction and operation. 
Respondents appear to concede as much. Respondents do 
broadly argue, however, that although safety regulation of 
nuclear plants by states is forbidden, a state may 
completely prohibit new construction until its safety 
concerns are satisfied by the Federal government. We reject 
this line of reasoning. State safety regulation is not 
preempted only when it conflicts with federal law. Rather, 
the Federal government has occupied the entire field of 
nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly 
ceded to the states ... A state moratorium on nuclear 
construction grounded in safety concerns falls squarely 
within the prohibited field. Moreover, a state judgment 
that nuclear power is not safe enough to be further 
developed would conflict directly with the countervailing 
judgment of the NRC ... that nuclear construction may proceed 
notwithstanding extant uncertainties as to waste disposal. 
A state prohibition on nuclear construction for safety 
reasons would also be in the teeth of the Atomic Energy 
Act's objective to insure that nuclear technology be safe 
enough for widespread development and use - and would be 
preempted for that reason. Id at 212-213. (emphasis 
added) -
There can be little question that a state law closing a nuclear 
plant due to waste disposal and safety concerns would be found 
unconstitutional based on the Pacific Gas and Electric analysis, 
unless Congress itself amended the Atomic Energy Act to authorize 
state safety regulation of nuclear power. In the event that the 
1987 Referendum were perceived, presented and defended as a 
reasonable effort to regulate nuclear power plant operation for 
reasons other than public health and safety, the outcome is less 
clear. It is, however, a fair statement that the weight of authority 
supports the probable preemption of the 1987 Referendum under either 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or the Federal Power Act. 
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C. Commerce Clause and Contract Clause Concerns 
Federal constitutional prohibitions against interference with 
interstate commerce or against state laws impairing existing 
contracts pose a broad range of questions whose answers are not as 
easily determined as is the case for federal preemption. In the 
case of unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce, the 
Federal Power Act cases referred to above also comprise authority 
for Commerce Clause violations. In a 1970 decision, Pike ~ Bruce 
Church, 397 US 137, 142 (1970), the U.S. Supreme Court enunciated a 
balancing test for determining when state regulation of interstate 
commerce exceeds the limits of the Commerce Clause: 
"where the [state] statute regulates evenhandedly 
to effectuate a legitimate local public interest 
and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits ... And the 
extent of the burden that will be tolerated will 
of course depend on the nature of the local 
interest involved, and on whether it could be 
promoted as well with a lesser impact on 
interstate activities. 
Given 50% ownership of Maine Yankee by out-of-state utilities, it 
will be difficult to characterize the closure of the plant as having 
only an "incidental" effect on interstate commerce. 
However, enactment of the 1987 Referendum cannot be 
characterized as an effort to secure for Maine citizens and 
ratepayers an economic advantage at the sole expense of out-of-state 
11 
citizens or ratepayers; fully 50% of the costs of replacement power 
plus 100% of any constitutionally required compensation to Maine 
Yankee's owners will ultimately be borne by Maine citizens alone. 
Hence, in this respect, the Referendum's enactment would not 
interfere with interstate commerce to the extent of causing citizens 
elsewhere to bear all costs, with consequent benefits to be received 
15 
solely by Maine citizens. 
The question of excessive burdens on interstate commerce also 
generates a related concern: can the local interests of opposing the 
siting in Maine of a nuclear waste facility or of halting the in-
state generation of nuclear waste be promoted by methods which have 
a "lesser impact" on interstate commerce? Resolution of these 
issues, and application of the Pike ~ Bruce Church balancing test, 
will necessarily await actual litigation in the event that the 1987 
Maine Yankee referendum is enacted. 
As with the analysis of Commerce Clause violations, the 
constitutionality of a state law under the Contract Clauses of the 
Maine or United States Constitutions requires demonstration of a 
16 
substantial public purpose. As stated by the u.s. Supreme 
15 
16 
See North Western Portland Cement v. Minnesota, 358 US 
450, 457 (1959). A court, of course, could determine that the 
replacement power costs imposed on out-of-state ratepayers in and 
of themselves impose an excessive burden on interstate commerce, 
notwithstanding the significantly greater costs also imposed on 
Maine ratepayers and taxpayers. 
The Maine Constitution at Article I, Section 11 states: 
"The Legislature shall pass no ... law impairing the obligation of 
contracts". 
12 
Court in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. ~Kansas Power and Light Co., 
459 US 400, 411-12 (1983), an unconstitutional impairment of 
contract requires a showing first that impairment is substantial, 
also that there is no "significant and legitimate" public purpose 
and finally that the resulting adjustment of contract rights is 
unreasonable. Federal and State courts have found constitutionally 
sufficient public purposes in state laws which: 
1) prohibited the sale of milk in plastic milk 
containers, given state interests in 
renewable sources and in energy conservation 
Minnesota~ Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 
us 456 (1981); 
2) required the local registration of securities 
offerings --Hall~ Geiger-Jones Co., 242 US 
539 (1917); 
3) regulated freighter emissions notwithstanding Coast 
Guard licensing of ships -- Huron Portland 
Cement Company~ Detroit, 362 US 440 (1960); 
4) established municipal woodyards for the 
·distribution of firewood -- Laughlin v. City 
of Portland, 90 A 318 (Me 1914). 
The breadth of these examples of permissible public purposes under 
the Commerce or Contract Clauses illustrates the difficulty of 
predicting how the courts would evaluate the legitimacy of the 
purposes underlying the 1987 Referendum. As noted by the Maine Law 
Court in a 1977 case, the "freedom to contract is necessarily 
subject to reasonable police power measures intended to promote and 
preserve the welfare of citizens". National Hearing Aid Centers v. 
13 
Smith, 376 A.2d 456, 461 (Me 1977). This is particularly true of 
contracts among regulated utilities for the generation of electricity 
where contract terms rountinely are conditioned on continued 
17 
regulatory approval and oversight. 
The reasonableness of methods selected by the state for 
implementing a legitimate public purpose is the remaining major 
I' ' 
component in the constitutional analysis required under the Pike v. 
Bruce Church and Energy Reserves decisions for the Commerce Clause 
and Contract Clauses, respectively. The Maine Law Court that "the 
methods adopted by the Legislature" need not "be the best or wisest 
choice ... if the measure is reasonably appropriate to accomplish the 
intended purpose". National Hearing Aid Centers at 461. However, 
state action will be ruled overburdening unless the local interest 
simply cannot be served by any less disruptive or burdensome 
18 
alternative. Here again, the rationale for the 1987 Referendum is 
crucial. Given the inaction of Congress in resolving radioactive 
waste siting controversies generated by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
of 1982, the courts will determine if less disruptive or burdensome 
17 
18 
This point is further amplified in a December 4, 1984 Attorney 
General letter opinion which examined the specific contract 
provisions of the Seabrook Joint Ownership Agreement (JOA) and 
found that a Maine Public Utilities Commission order requiring 
Maine's Seabrook owners to disengage from that project would "not 
violate the reasonable expectations of the parties to the JOA, and 
would not be found to 'impair' the contract, in the constitutional 
sense at all." 
Edgar v. Mite Corporation, 457 US 624 (1982) where a 
state law requiring tender offers anywhere in the country be 
registered in Illinois was struck down notwithstanding its 
protection of local investors from corporate take-over. Also see 
Hunt ~ Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 US 333 
(1977). 
14 
alternatives exist to the outright closing of Maine Yankee under 
state law. To the extent that the fundamental rationale of the 1987 
Referendum is presented instead as a purely economic matter, focus-
ing hypothetically on alleged losses on property values near the 
Wiscasset reactor, a court will evaluate an entirely different set 
of alternatives to plant closure - such as general fund compensa-
tion for affected property owners. If the burden on interstate 
commerce, or interference with the contract rights of Maine Yankee's 
owners and customers, is found to be excessive, the 1987 Referendum 
will be ruled unconstitutional on either or both of these grounds. 
D. Just Compensation under the Fifth Amendment 
Both the Maine and United States Constitutions provide 
assurance that private property may not be taken without a public 
19 
purpose and without payment of just compensation. These 
Constitutional guarantees, as well as the state and federal court 
cases interpreting them, hinge on three successive issues: when 
does the State have power to take private property? If such power 
is lawfully used, does the State owe compensation? By what measure 
of value must compensation be awarded? Each of these questions 
presents different issues for consideration in the context of a 
forced shut down of the Maine Yankee power plant. 
19 
Article I, Section 21 of the Maine Constitution provides: 
"Private property shall not be taken for public uses without just 
compensation; nor unless the public exigencies require it" The 
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constituion reads in part: " ... nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation". 
15 
1) State Power To Take Control Use of Private Prope~!Y, 
A state typically exercises its power to control the use of 
private property by regulating the use of the property. Some 
the control is achieved in a manner that constitutes a taking f the 
private property. A taking may also be accomplished overtly by 
means of eminent domain authority. The use of these extraordinary 
powers has prompted numerous courts to caution that considerable 
care is necessary to evaluate whether compensation is owed at al 
For example, the Maine Law Court has stated in this context: 
"Before legislation may be declared in violation of the 
Constitution, that fact must be established to such a degree of 
certainty as to leave no room for reasonable doubt'1 ,. Orono-Veazie 
-~-. -~·-..-.o..,~,...-
Wat.~r District Y.::_ Penobscot County Water CompanY., 348 A~ 2d 24 (Me 
1975). Furthermore, there is considerable Maine and u.s. Supreme 
Court precedent for the proposition that, when the state 
exercises its police powers, the complete elimination of a non-
conforming business may not create a compensable loss under the 
20 
Fifth Amendment or its state constitutional equivalent. 
20 
Hadacheck ~Los Angeles, 239 US 394 (1915), zoning 
ordinance shuts down brickyard; Mugler ~ Kansas, 123 US 623 
(1887), brewery closed by Prohibition Law; Reinman v. Little 
Roc~; 237 us 171 (1913), livery stable closed as a nui.sance®. 
Also see, Shapiro Brothers Shoe Co. ~ Lewiston-Auburn, 320 A.2d 
247 (Me. 1974), severance pay required; State v. Lewis, 406 A.2d 
886 (Me~ 1979), junkyard closed; State v. McKinnon,-r-33 A .. 2d 885 
(Me 1955), game preserve created; Jones-v. Polland, 93 A.2d 41 
(Me. 191.5), aff 'd 245 US 217 ( 1917), fuel yard created; WadJ7_eiSLh. v ~ 
Gilman, 12 Me. 403 (Me. 1835) wooden structures prohibited. In 
none of these cases did the Fifth Amendment or Maine constitution. 
require the payment of compensation. 
16 
While there must be a public use to justify a state taking, the 
u.s. Supreme Court has stated that it is proper to defer to the 
Legislature (or in the case of the 1978 Referendum to the voters) in 
determining whether the public use is a reasonable one. Hawaii 
Housing Authority~ Midkiff 467 US 229, 244 (1984). Under current 
Fifth Amendment standards, it appears that as long as the public use 
merely represents a "conceivable public purpose", a state will 
satisfy the threshold public purpose requirement. Id. at 241. 
Assuming the Referundum survives constitutional challenge under the 
Supremacy, Commerce, and Contract Clauses, it appears likely that 
the 1987 Referendum would pass this threshold test, i.e., that the 
Referendum would be found to reflect a reasonable public purpose so 
as to justify state control of the use of the propertya The 
question then becomes whether the exercise of the control 
constitutes a taking or merely a reasonable regulation of use. 
2) Compensation Due only when a Taking has Occurred 
Just compensation is owed only in circumstances where the 
courts find that a constitutional taking has occurred. The courts' 
inquiry will necessarily be ad hoc and circumstantial and involves 
no pat formula. Connolly~ Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 106 S. 
Ct. 1018, 1026 (1986). No taking occurs, or is compensation owed, 
unless the state interferes with distinct investment-backed 
expectations to a major and unsupportable degree. Penn Central 
Transportation Corp.~ New York City, 98 s. Ct. 2646, 2659 (1978). 
Recent Maine Law Court decisions go futher: just compensation may 
be due only in cases where the market value of the condemned 
17 
property has been reduced to zero. Due to the fact that the 
affected property retained rental income potential or could be sold, 
the Law Court concluded that no taking had occurred in a recent 
case: 
It is clear from the preponderance of the 
believable evidence that beneficial and 
valuable uses of their property remain 
available to the Halls despite the denial of 
a building permit by the B.E.P. Accordingly, 
we hold that there has been no taking of the 
Hall property in violation of article 1, 
section 21 of the Maine Constitution. Hall 
v. Board of Environmental Protection, 
-- A.2d ___ (1987), slip. op. at 5, 7/14/87. 
It is by no means certain that either a federal court or the Law 
Court would construe the U.S. Constitution requirements on an 
identical basis in the case of a state-mandated closure of Maine 
21 
Yankee. 
The general rule has been that when property is rendered 
"substantially useless" due to state action, a compensable taking 
has occurred. Sibley~ Inhabitants of the Town of Wells, 462 A.2d 
29, 31 (Me 1983); LURC ~White, 521 A.2d 710 (Me 1987). Examples of 
compensable takings in U.S. Supreme Court precedent follow this 
general rule, not requiring elimination of all property values in 
the case of aircraft overflights, artillery shells over claimants' 
21 
Such an analysis would presumably consider whether the 
Wiscasset site could continue to provide value for its owners by 
generating electricity by non-nuclear means. 
18 
property, or repeated floodings caused by a water project. See Penn 
Central at 2661. Based on these and other cases, it is clear that 
the question of whether the forced closure of Maine Yankee 
constitutes a compensable taking will hinge on interpretations of 
fact: will the Maine Yankee owners retain significant beneficial 
uses of their property after closure, will the public utility status 
of the owners ensure mitigation of any loss or will the value of the 
property realistically be reduced to zero? In determining how these 
questions of fact are answered, the court will be guided by 
22 
fundamental principles of fairness. It remains uncertain if 
these principles compel payment to Maine Yankee's owners of any 
compensation whatever, particularly given the public utility status 
of the owners. 
3) Measure of Value for a Compensable Taking 
In the event that some compensation will be due, on the basis 
that a taking has occurred, the remaining questions concern the 
proper measurement of the Maine Yankee owners' loss. There are 
three standards of value which could be applied if the courts find 
that compensation is required. In descending monetary value, these 
three are: (a) the costs of constructing a "substitute facility" 
elsewhere, (b) the fair market value of the nuclear power plant and 
22 
"The purpose of forbidding uncompensated takings of 
private property for public use is "to bar government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole". 
Penn Central at 1027 citing Armstrong v. US, 364 US 40, 49 (1960). ----
19 
(3) the book value of the power plant, less depreciation, as 
recorded for ratemaking by the Public Utilities Commission and by· 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Administration. 
a) Substitute Facility 
The use of a "substitute facility" measurement of just 
compensation can be expected to cost a total of $3-5 billion in 
construction costs and interest expense, based on completion costs 
for recent nuclear power plants of Maine Yankee's size or greater. 
In a 1979 case, the United States Supreme Court rejected the 
"substitute facilities" measure of compensation for condemned 
property owned by a non-profit summer camp organization. US v. 
564.54 Acres of Land, 441 US 506 (US, 1979). Noting that 
"substitute facilities" compensation has been ordered primarily in 
the case of public condemnees, such as roads or sewers taken by the 
state for another purpose, the Court stated: 
In condemnations of property owned by public 
entities, lower courts have applied the 
reasonable-necessity standard to determine if the 
entity has an obligation to continue providing the 
facilities taken ... If the condemnee has such a 
duty to replace the property, these courts have 
reasoned that only an award of the costs of 
developing requisite substitute facilities will 
compensate for the loss. US v. 564.54 Acres of 
Land at 515. ------
In the case of Maine Yankee, its owners are obligated under 
varying state utility laws to provide electricity to the public, but 
are not specifically required to generate that electricity at a 
20 
nuclear facility. Consequently, it would not appear that the 
"substitute facilities" standard would be required in the case of 
compensation due Maine Yankee's owners. 
b) Fair Market Value 
While generally the courts have held that fair market value is 
23 
the normal basis for just compensation, its use is not compelled 
in cases which would result in "manifest injustice to owner or 
24 
public" or where fair market value is difficult to ascertain. 
Because public utility facilities rarely trade hands, it certainly 
is the case that the value of Maine Yankee as a capital asset sold 
on an open market will be exceedingly difficult to establish. The 
value of capacity and energy generated at Maine Yankee during the 
remaining years of its NRC license is more susceptible to fair 
market value estimation within the existing NEPOOL market for power; 
in fact, the cost of replacement power is selected in both 1986 and 
1987 State Planning Office studies as the most objective standard 
for measuring any compensation w:hich might be owed to Maine Yankee's 
owners. Notwithstanding the difficulty of making precise estimates 
of the value of the facility itself, there can be little doubt that 
the Maine Yankee owners will point to fair market value compensation 
23 
Olson v. US, 292 US 246, 255 (1934), Knox Lime Co. v. 
Maine state Highway Commission, 230 A.2d 814 (Me 1967). 
24 
US v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 US 121, 123 (1950); 
US v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 US 24, 30 (1984). 
21 
as the measure which has been regularly upheld in the case of public 
takings of private property. US v. 564.54 Acres of Land at 515. 
c) Net Book Value 
The remaining question then becomes: can Maine Yankee's value 
properly be measured by the net book value of the facility, after 
adjustments for depreciation over 15 years, and as recorded in 
regulatory accounting practice? This question ultimately can only 
be determined by a court and is subject to conflicting claims. On 
the one hand, the courts have repeatedly discounted claims of loss 
. 25 
for future profits as not compensable under the Fifth Amendment; 
hence, the Maine Yankee owners' claim for compensation on a future 
26 
return on the net book value of their asset is subject to 
challenge. On the other hand, numerous courts have distinguished as 
inconsistent the underlying purposes of ratemaking valuation of 
27 
utility property and of Fifth Amendment compensation. 
To the extent that any compensation paid to the owners will be 
treated as a credit in setting retail rates for Maine Yankee's 
25 
26 
"The opportunity to use property for future profit is not 
such a fundamental attribute of ownership [as to require 
compensation]" Seven Island Land Co. v. Maine LURC, 450 
A.2d 475, note 10 (Me. 1982), quoting~ndrus v. Allard, 444 US 
51, 60 (1980). 
Maine Yankee's net book value as of June 30, 1987, including 
recent construction work, was $209,339,893, plus nuclear fuel. 
27
onondaga County Water Authority~ NY Water Service Corp., 
13 9 NY. 2d 7 55, 7 6 3 ( 19 55) . 
22 
owners, it is probable that any taxpayer payment to Central Maine 
Power, Maine Public Service and Bangor Hydro ultimately will be used 
to reduce their respective costs of service to Maine ratepayers. If 
the Public Utilities Commission were to adopt this ratemaking 
treatment, the actual impact of the 1987 Referendum on Maine 
ratepayers would become the increased costs of replacement power 
28 
alone. However, it is by no means as clear that utilities 
commissions in the other New England states are authorized, or 
compelled, to make the same offsetting adjustment in retail rates 
for Maine Yankee's seven out-of-state owners. Hence, Maine 
taxpayers will necessarily have to bear the full requirement of 
compensating these out-of-state owners. In effect, this would 
constitute a transfer payment from Maine's General Fund to the rest 
of New England equal to 50% of the value of Maine Yankee. 
4) Length and Costs of Litigation 
Based on the previous discussion of federal preemption, 
Commerce Clause, Contract Clause and taking questions under the 
28 
Additionally, Maine taxpayers who are not ratepayers of 
the Maine owners would bear the full cost of the increased tax 
obligation, without any offsetting adjustment in retail rates. 
This group would include all ratepayers of Maine's publicly owned 
utilities, including the towns of Madison, Houlton, Kennebunk and 
the Union River, Fox Island and Eastern Maine Electric 
Cooperatives. The latter, serving 9000 customers in Penobscot, 
Washington and Aroostook counties would additionally lose its 
entitlement to a small amount of Maine Yankee capacity and would 
consequently bear the costs of replacement power as well. 
23 
Fifth Amendment, it is evident that the enactment of the 1987 
Referendum could well set in process a complex and time-consuming 
series of court challenges to the new law. The fact that these 
questions have not previously been litigated in the context of a 
forced nuclear plant closure will only add to the time and expense 
of these challenges. Insofar as any final judicial decision 
upholding the 1987 Referendum could well stimulate similar efforts 
in other states, it is likely that the legal resources available to 
the Maine Yankee owners will be substantial. 
Consequently, it is easy to predict that the litigation 
triggered by enactment of the Referendum will not be concluded until 
well into the next decade and tht it will be costly. The 
recoverability from ratepayers of costs of this litigation (at the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for wholesale ratemaking 
purposes and at the Maine Public Utilities Commission for retail 
making purposes) may itself be the subject of future litigation. 
The more important issue is whether, assuming no pre-emption, 
the state would owe compensation from the date of the Referendum's 
enactment, as opposed to the date that a court finally rules that 
compensation is due - hypothetically in 1992. Until recently, the 
answer to this question was relatively simple: Maine Yankee's 
owners would have to wait for compensation until the date of a final 
court determination and only then after all proper procedures and 
remedies had been pursued. As of that eventual date, compensation 
24 
could well be prospective only and not encompass any claim of taking 
29 
for the period covered by the appeal itself. 
A 1987 United States.Supreme Court decision has for the first 
time concluded that, if Fifth Amendment concerns ultimately compel 
payment of just compensation, compensation is also owed for the 
"temporary taking" which occurred while the issue was before the 
courts. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale ~ 
county of Los Angeles, ___ us ___ , slip. £2· 6/9/87. In cases where a 
condemnee has been denied all use of its property during the appeal 
period prior to a successful appeal, failure to provide "payment of 
fair value for the use of the property during this period of time 
would be a constitutionally insufficient remedy." First Lutheran, 
slip. 2£· at 16. Based on this recent decision, it appears probable 
that replacement power costs, or some other measure of fair value, 
would be awarded Maine Yankee's owners for the appeal period, if 
they eventually prevail in a claim for just compensation. 
It should be noted, however, that given the likelihood of 
federal preemption of the 1987 Referendum, Maine Yankee's owners 
could well prevail in any request for a Temporary Restraining Order 
permitting the continued operation of the power plant during the 
period of litigation. In such a case, compensation for a temporary 
29 
See MacDonald, Sommer and Frates v. Yolo ounty, 477 
US===, slip. QE· (1986); Williamson-count¥ Regional Planning 
Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172, n. 11 (1985); but see US v. 
Sioux Nation of Indians, 100 S. Ct. 2716 (1980) where the Court 
orders interest from 1877 as proper measure of retroactive 
compensation. 
25 
taking need not be awarded since the power plant will not cease 
operation as a result of state action. If the owners simply comply 
with state law and seek no injunction permitting the continued 
operation of the plant, the First Lutheran decision arguably could 
compel state payment for all costs during the appeal period. Such a 
decision by the owners, of course, would have major detrimental 
effects on electric rates throughout New England. 
Unless a court ultimately upholds the constitutionality of the 
Referendum in a final judgment, and finds that a compensable taking 
has occurred, no compensation would be owed Maine Yankee's owners. 
Without specific findings that no Supremacy, Contract or Commerce 
Clause violation has occurred, the 1987 Referendum will be overturned 
and have no force and effect. 
26 
Appendix 2 
Maine Public Utilities Commission Staff Estimates of Annual Costs 
to Replace Maine Yankee Power, 1989-2008 



Appendix 3 
Memorandum from Joseph Sukaskas to Richard Parker, Maine 
Public Utilities Commission Regarding Nuclear Safety and 
Decommissioning Issues 

STATE OF MAINE 
lnter ... Departmental Memorandum Date_A_u_g_u_s_t_6_,_ 198 7 
To Richard Parker, Senior Utility Planner Dept. _____ P_u_c __ -_T_e_c_h_n_l_· c_.a_l _ A_n_a_l_y_s_i_s __ 
From Joe Sukaskas, Technical Analyst Dept. PUC - Technical Analysis 
Subject_ Maine yankee Shutdown 
Your July 21 memo assigned me the responsibility to "review and update decom-
missioning cost estimates, and nuclear safety issues" for the Maine Yankee Shutdown 
Assessment 1987 Update. 
Attached are my draft comments and material compiled to address those issues. 
My comments are in draft form, and will need to be integrated into an overall out-
line at a later date. 
With respect to safety, comparisons have been made between Maine Yankee and 
other plants, and a summary of the plant's last three years' safety reports is 
included. 
As spent nuclear fuel is a topic which is integral to both safety and also 
other shutdown-related issues as well, an update is provided on both economic and 
physical aspects of this topic. 
A summary of potential Maine Yankee accident costs has been included, followed 
by an update of the implications of Chernobyl. That section includes both technical 
and systematic parallels, and touches briefly on complications of preemption. 
Finally, an update of Maine Yankee decommissioning factors is presented, along 
with a listing of decommissioning resources for further reference. 
Some of the information enclosed can be directly inserted into the study re-
port body, if found acceptable by the coordinating·staff. Parts of the attached 
information may be more appropriate for inclusion in a technical appendix, however. 
All referenced materials are available in the MPUC IRC. 
Please advise what additional information you would like, or what restatement 
or redrafting of these materials could be useful in completing the assessment re-
port. 
cc: Richard Darling 
MAINE YANKEE SHUTDOWN ASSESSMENT 
JDS COMMENTS/MATERIAL 
Generation Productivity 
Unplanned Reactor Scrams 
NRC Evaluations 
Safety Reporting 
Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Spent Fuel Storage 
Financial Consequences of a Catastrophic Accident 
Chernobyl 
System Design 
Operator and Procedural Error 
An Industry View 
Implications of the Chernobyl Accident 
Federal Preemption 
Deconunissioning 
MPUC Resources - Maine Yankee Decommissioning 
NRC EVALUATIONS. A measure of the compliance of nuclear generating sta-
tions with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) performance criteria is 
the NRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program. 
The SALP program is an integrated NRC staff effort to consolidate 
available observations and data and to evaluate licensee performance based 
on this information. It assesses licensee performance in selected func-
tional areas. For facilities in operation these areas generally include: 
plant operations (OPS), radiological controls (RADCON), maintenance 
(MAINT), surveillance (SURV), emergency preparedness (EP), fire protection 
(FP), security (SEC), outages (OUTG), quality programs and administrative 
control s a f f e c t i n g qual i t y ( Q P ) , l i c ens i n g act i v i t i e s ( L I C ) , and t r a i n i n g 
and qualification effectiveness (TRG). 
Based on a review of the consolidated information, each functional area 
evaluated is placed into one of three performance categories. A Category 1 
rating designates a high 1 evel of performance, a Category 2 rating 
designates a satisfactory level of performance, and a Category 3 rating 
designates a minimally acceptable level of performance where weaknesses are 
evident, and both NRC and licensee attention should be increased. 
ORAFT/8-87 
SALP ratings for Maine Yankee, and the average of SALP ratings for 
twenty-seven reactors operating in NRC's Region I (northeast), taken from 
NRC's spring, 1987 summary of these ratings,* and NRC's subsequent Maine 
Yankee SALP~ are shown below. 
MAINE YANKEE MAINE YANKEE MAINE YANKEE NRC REG 1 
9/84 l/86 4/87 3/87 
OPS 3 2 1 1. 8 
RADCON 2 2 2 1.8 
MAINT 2 2 2 1.8 
SURV 2 1 1 1.6 
FP 2 1 N 1.3 
EP 1 1 1 1.5 
SEC 1 1 1 1.5 
OUTG 1 2 N 1.6 
QP N N 2 1.9 
LIC 2 2 2 1.6 
TRG N N 1 1.9 
N: Not rated in assessment period 
*"Historical Data Summary of the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Perfor-
mance," NUREG-1214 Revision 1, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April 1987. 
ORAFT/8-87 
GENERATION PRODUCTIVITY. A measure of the productivity of a power generat-
ing plant is the unit's Capacity Factor (CF), which is the ratio of total 
gross power generated, in MwH, to the product of the plant's gross generat-
ing capacity and the number of hours in the period under study. 
A comparison of the Capacity Factors for Maine Yankee, for eight New 
England nuclear generating plants, and for all nuclear generating plants 
operating in the U.S., derived from data published in Nucleonics Week, is 
shown be 1 ow. 
NEW MAINE 
PERIOD u.s. ENGLAND YANKEE 
1984 59.5% 63.7% 70.1% 
1985 55.2% 73.0% 73.6% 
1986 56.7% 62.5% 85.4% 
1987* 61.5% 75.4% 84.6% 
(Jan-Mar) 
*Through the end of Maine Yankee's last operating cycle. 
UNPLANNED REACTOR SCRAMS. A measure of the reliability of reactor plant 
systems is the number of unplanned reactor scrams, or shutdowns, encount-
ered per year. A comparison of the number of unplanned scrams at Maine 
Yankee, with the average number of such shutdowns at groups of similar 
plants, is shown below. 
PERIOD 
1984 
1985 
1986 
MAINE 
YANKEE 
5 
6 
4 
C-E 
PWRs* 
5.9 
7.5 
6.2 
ALLALL 
PWRs*LWRs* 
6.35.9 
6.76.0 
5.35.1 
This data was derived from reports 
Nuclear News, and from Maine Yankee data. 
of NRC evaluations appearing in 
*KEY 
-PWR: 
C-E: 
LWR: 
Pressurized Water Reactor 
Combustion Engineering (supplier of the Maine Yankee Nuclear 
Steam Supply System) 
Light Water Reactor (includes both Boiling Water Reactors and 
PWRs) 
SAFETY REPORTING. Mai.ne Yankee is required by statute (35-A M.R.S.A. 
4334) to report safety-related incidents at the plant. According to the 
company's reports, "not all of the subjects covered ••• are safety relat-
ed," but include reports "about non-safety aspects of safety-related equip-
ment and systems ••• in order to provide a broad view of the operation of 
Maine Yankee." 
Maine Yankee listed 18 "Reportable Occurrences" in 1984, 19 in 1985, 
and 8 in 1986. Summaries as reported by Maine Yankee appear on the follow-
ing pages. 
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL. The Nuclear Waste Fund was established to 
f1nance act1v1t1es under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 
(the Act), Public Law 97-425. 
The Act's key financial concept is that the cost to the 
Federal Government of providing disposal and/or storage services 
shall be fully recovered from the generators and owners of spent 
nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste. 
The Nuclear Waste Fund is the financing mechanism _for 
DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), 
the office charged with managing the nation's nuclear waste 
program in accordance with the mandates of the Act. 
with DOE, 
disposal 
beginning 
quarterly 
Under the Act, nuclear utilities, through contracts 
pay a one mill (one-tenth of a cent) per kilowatt hour 
fee for commercial spent nuclear fuel generated 
April 7, 1983. Maine Yankee pays these fees on a 
basis. 
For commercial spent fuel or high-level waste generated 
prior to April 7, 1983, three payment options were made available 
to utilities: 1) pay in 40 quarterly installments with accrued 
interest; 2) pay in a lump sum with accrued interest prior to the 
first scheduled delivery of spent fuel to DOE for disposal; or 3) 
pay in a lump sum prior to June 30, 1985, with no interest. 
Most owners and generators of commercial spent fuel and 
high-level waste, primarily utilities, chose to pay the one-time 
fee by _June 30, 1985.* 
Maine Yankee, however, elected to make a single payment 
under the second option outlined above, and in 1983 entered into 
a contract with DOE covering on-going fuel disposal cost, as well 
as the accrued prior obligation of $50,367,000. 
Interest on the obligation accrues at the 13-week 
Treasury Bill rate compounded on a quarterly basis from April 7, 
1983, through the date of the actual payment. Interest accrued 
through December 31, 1986, amounted to $17,964,000. The Company 
has formed a trust to provide for payment of this long-term fuel 
o b 1 i gat i on • Fund i n g of the trust i s be i n g made by de po s i t s of 
approximately $4,100,000 at least semiannually beginning Decem-
ber, 1985, and continuing through May, 1997, totaling 
approximately $98,800,000. The trust fund deposits plus 
estimated earnings are projected to meet the total estimated 
liability of $169,600,000.** 
[*"OCRWM Backgrounder: The Status of the Nuclear Waste Fund, 11 
DOE/RW-0034, Office of Policy and Outreach, Office of Civilian 
Radioactive Waste Management 
**Part I, Item 1-Business, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
Report, Form 1, Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, Form 10-K -
1986.) 
t~aine Yankee has named Norstar Bank of Maine as its 
trustee, and has reported that as of December 31, 1986 the 
carrying value of the fund was $17,091,310.71 and the fund had a 
market value of $17,664,053.24. According to the Companyus 
report, the Funds have continued to be invested in tax exempt 
securities with no maturity later than January 1, 1988, and the 
weighted average yield to maturity of the fund as of December 31, 
1986, was 7.28%* 
The Act requires an annual evaluation of the adequacy 
of the one-mil per kilowatt hour fee to ensure full cost recovery 
and provide for adjustment of that fee, as needed, with the 
approval of Congress. A proposal to Congress for a fee 
adjustment is required only if DOE determines that an adjustment 
to the on-going fee is required. To date, such an adjustment has 
not been necessary. OCRWM's last evaluation** found the leO mill 
per net kilowatt-hour fee adequate. 
Further, the DOE Inspector General reviewed the 
pro~edures and practices used to compute and collect the fees due 
to the Nuclear Waste Fund, to include both on-going and one-time 
fees.. The I G found "adequate contro 1 s exist to determine and 
collect on-going fees. 11 However, some concerns were expressed 
about the complete availability of funds when payment is due, 
particularly in cases where utilities faced future financial 
uncertainties.*** 
*Maine Yankee Report to the Governor on the Status of the Spent 
Nuclear Fuel Disposal Trust Fund, February 9, 1987. 
**~~Nuclear Waste Fund Fee Adequacy: An Assessment," DOE/RW-0020 
Rev., Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, June, 
1987 .. 
***
11 Accuracy of Fees Paid by the Civilian Power Industry to the 
Nuclear Waste Fund," DOE/IG-0231, Office of Inspector General, 
U.S. Department of Energy, October 27, 1986. 
SPENT FUEL STORAGE. Until the Department of Energy (DOE) accepts 
spent nuclear fuel* for disposal at a Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
(NWPA) facility, nuclear utilities have the primary 
responsibility for the storage of their spent fuel and for the 
effective use of that storage capacity. Spent fuel assemblies 
removed from nuclear reactors are stored temporarily in water 
pools that cool the spent fuel rods and shield workers and others 
at the site against radiation. Many of these storage pools were 
intended originally for short-term storage, and their capacities 
are generally limited. 
A Maine statute (35-A M.R.S.A. 4371) provides that 
after July 1, 1992, spent nuclear fuel may not be stored on-site 
for a period exceeding three years from the date of removal of 
the fuel from the reactor. The Company has estimated that 
shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the DOE will not commence 
before 1998. ** Recent government-industry estimates for repo-
sitory startup schedules which would trigger such shipments 
project 2003 as a more likely operational date. 
We cannot predict whether, or to what extent, the Maine 
statute and storage capacity limitations referred to above may be 
modified and whether, or to what extent, they will affect the 
operation of Maine Yankee. The statute does not explicitly 
govern the operation of Maine Yankee. The question is whether 
Maine Yankee could continue to operate the generating plant if 
its spent fuel facilities were in violation of the statute. The 
answer to this question depends on the interpretation and 
application of the statute and the constitutionally thereof. 
(*Spent nuclear fuel refers to fuel that has been removed from a 
nuclear reactor core primarily because it can no longer sustain 
an efficient chain reaction. High-level radioactive waste, 
generated from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to extract 
plutonium and the remaining usable uranium, results largely from 
defense nuclear activities. 
**Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Report, Form 1, Maine 
Yankee Atomic Power Company, Form 10-K, 1986.) 
Under the terms of a license amendment approved by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1984, the present storage 
capacity of the spent fuel pool at Maine Yankee will be reached 
in 1996, and after 1992 the available capacity of the pool would 
not accommodate a full core removal. 
Some nuclear utilities, faced with potential spent fuel 
storage problems, have developed and subsequently obtained 
approval from the NRC for various methods of extending their 
on-site storage capacity.* 
One method employed by the utilities is the "reracking .. 
of fuel assemblies in storage pools to obtain greater storage 
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REF: Maine Yankee Event Report 86-006 
On October 19, 1986, a steel beam above one of the main station output 
transformers became overheated due to the failure of the normal ground path 
for the generator isophase bus duct. The reactor and turbine generator were 
manually tripped fr9m 92% power to prevent further equipment degradation. 
Investigation revealed that the ground shunts for the normal path had been 
improperly installed. Corrective actions included repairing and reinstalling 
the ground shunts, inspecting the beam and ductwork for damage and inspecting 
other similar shunts. All ground connections were reinspected after return to 
full power and no hot spots detected. 
Human health and the environment were not affected by this event. 
Corrective action costs were less than two thousand dollars. 
REF: Maine Yankee Licensee Event Report 86-007 
On November 15, 1986, the reactor automatically tripped from 100% power when 
loss of the turbine-driven main feedwater pump tripped the main turbine. A 
loose electrical connection on the feedwater pump•s main oil pump caused the 
oil pump to stop. The standby oil pump did not recover control oil pressure 
soon enough and the feedwater pump tripped. The loose connection was repaired 
and modifications were made to the oil system to ensure the standby oil pump 
will recover system pressure prior to reaching the trip setpoint. 
There were no effects on human health or the environment. 
The corrective action costs were less than one thousand dollars. 
REF: Maine Yankee Licensee Event Report 86-008 
On December 2, 1986, a power reduction from 97% power was commenced when both 
subsystems of the standby control room breathing air were declared inoperable 
due to insufficient flow rate. Immediate corrective action involved removing 
the internals of the inline check valve in one subsystem, increasing the flow 
rate in that subsystem above the required minimum. The power reduction was 
stopped at 35% power when the standby breathing air system was declared 
operable. Additional corrective action involved installation of new check 
valves in each subsystem. Each subsystem now provides sufficient air flow to 
exceed minimum requirements. 
There were no effects on human health or the environment. 
The corrective action costs were less than two thousand dollars. 
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densities. By changing the configuration of the racks that .hold 
the spent fuel in the storage pools, and by adding 
neutron-absorbing material, it is possible to store more than 
double the fuel than had been held in the originally designed 
rae ks. 
Another method is "rod consolidation," which differs 
from reracking in that rod consolidation involves dismantling the 
fuel assemblies in reconfigured storage racks that are designed 
for higher storage densities. Rod consolidation may be done in a 
storage pool, or it may be done in a dry environment. Rod 
consolidation increases the capacity of spent fuel storage pools 
that have sufficient structural strength to safely support a more 
compact array of spent fuel rods that have been separated from 
their associated hardware components. 
(*"OCRWM Backgrounder: Cooperative Demonstration Projects for 
Spent Nuclear Fuel, 11 DOE/RW-0099, Office of Policy and Outreach, 
U.S. Department of Energy, September, 1986.) 
In 1981, DOE successfully completed a "cold" 
(non-radioactive) demonstration of prototypical rod consolidation 
equipment. In May 1983, DOE issued a solicitation for 
cooperative agreement proposals for in-pool rod consolidation 
demonstrations that could provide a basis for future licensing by 
the NRC. A cooperative agreement for a rod consolidation 
demonstration project has been negotiated with the Northeast 
Utilities Services Company of Hartford, Connecticut. 
In Maine Yankee's case, the Atomic Safety and Licensing 
Board has approved the company's proposal to test a consolidation 
methodology which would, if implemented, permit storage capacity 
through the operating life of the plant. That implementation 
would require further approval from the NRC. 
A third alternative could be a dry storage method. Dry 
storage systems provide a fuel storage alternative when reracking 
or rod consolidation cannot be undertaken because of economic, 
seismic, or structural limitations of spent fuel storage pool 
systems. Systems for dry storage include casks, drywells, silos, 
and vaults. Casks are large metal containers with radiation 
shielding that are stored above ground. Drywells are below-grade 
wells with steel and concrete lining that are designed to hold 
one or more spent fuel assemblies; the surrounding earth provides 
an additional radiation barrier, as well as a medium for 
conducting heat from the dry well. Silos are concrete cylinders 
built above ground that provide sealed secondary containment for 
spent fuel. Vaults are large concrete structures that use 
natural air convection for cool in g. All of these dry storage 
systems are designed to have low maintenance requirements and to 
be modular in order to provide additional capacity as required. 
However, dry storage systems demonstrated under the DOE's 
auspices have never been licensed by the NRC for commercial use. 
Dry storage casks with a capacity of twelve fuel assemblies have 
been estimated to cost up to $2 million each, and, thus, the 
economic viabiljty of this alternative has yet to be proven. 
Maine Yankee received approval for a limited pilot rod 
consolidation project, and has authorization to consolidate 
twenty fuel assemblies on a demonstration basis. One 8-in. by 
8-in. fuel assembly has been processed under that authorization, 
and the company has indicated that it plans to complete the 
demonstration project prior to 1990. 
The company's estimate of spent fuel pool capacity is 
that it will accomodate the plant's spent nuclear fuel storage 
needs until 1999. That estimate does not assume that storage 
space is available for the fuel in the plant's reactor core, 
however; to maintain the capability for unloading the entire 
core, know as "full core rejection" (FCR) capability, a pool 
exhaust date of 1995 can be assumed. 
Maine Yankee's planned rod consolidation methodology 
would increase the pool's storage capacity by 60%, and, thus, 
would enable the plant to extend the spent fuel pool exhaust date 
past the plant's operating license expiration in 2008. 
FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENT. The April, 
1986 Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union showed that a major 
nuclear power plant accident could cause significant personal 
injury and property damage. At that time, the potential 
financial consequences of such an accident in this country had 
not been assessed. At the request of Senator George Mitchell, 
the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated what these 
consequences might be and examined the need for fi nanc i a 1 
protection against a nuclear accident in this country. The GAO 
report* was addressed to various Congressional committees because 
of the broad implications of these issues, to assist those 
c omm i t tees i n rea sse s s i n g l i a b i 1 i t y protect i on pro v i de d by the 
Price-Anderson Act. 
Inflation has decreased the level of financial 
protection originally established by that act; the $560 million 
limit for commercial activities would be $2.2 billion in today's 
dollars. Further, on the basis of GAO's assessment, the off-site 
financial consequences of a catastrophic accident for 119 
commercial plants could range from $67 million to $15.5 billion; 
the consequences for Maine Yankee were estimated by GAO to be: 
Estimated Property Costs: 
Million 
Personal Injury Costs: 
Million 
Total Consequences: 
Million 
$ 2 9 1 
6 4 
$ 3 5 5 
*"Nuclear Regulation: A Perspective on Liability Protection for 
a Nuclear Plant Accident," GAO/RCED-87-124, U.S. General 
Accounting Office, June, 1987. 
The Price-Anderson Act may not cover the costs of a 
precautionary evacuation at an NRC licensee, however. The act 
defines a nuclear incident as an occurrence that causes damage as 
a result of the radioactive properties of nuclear materials. 
Confusion exists over whether the public could seek compensation 
where the release of radioactive material appears imminent, such 
that a precautionary evacuation is ordered, but no release 
occurs. NRC's licensees thus carry insurance to cover 
precautionary evacuation costs. 
CHERNOBYL. In the past year, exhaustive studies of the April, 
1986, accident at the Soviet Union's Chernobyl-4 nuclear power 
station have been conducted, with the international scientific 
community seeking to identify any lessons which could be learned 
from that accident for improving nuclear plant safety. 
Conclusions which have been drawn are similar, but 
recommendations based on those conclusions vary widely. 
As the Soviet report prepared for the International 
Atomic Energy Agency stated: 
"The accident at Chernobyl' was the result of 
coincidences of several events of low 
probability."* 
Most published assessments concur with that statement, and go on 
to attribute specific causes of the accident to system design, and also to 
operator and procedural error. 
*"The Accident at the Chernobyl' AES and its Consequences," U.S.S.R. State 
Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, August, 1986. 
SYSTEM DESIGN. The accident at Chernobyl-4 involved a Soviet-designed 
high-power, graphite-moderated boiling-water-cooled reactor, identified as 
an RBMK-1000 system. According to compendium of U.S. assessments,* this 
uniquely Soviet design evolved from early demonstration and plutonium pro-
duction reactors. General characteristics of the RBMK and its predecessors 
include the use of graphite as a neutron moderator and light water as the 
coolant. Pressure tubes, contained in vertical channels in the graphite, 
either contain low-enriched uranium oxide fuel or are used as locations for 
control rods and instrumentation. 
The use of boiling water as a coolant in a pressure-tube, graphite-
moderated reactor distinguishes the RBMK design from any other reactor 
design. Other distinguishing features of the RBMK design include: 
on-line refueling 
single uranium enrichment level 
separation of core cooling into independent halves 
use of computerized control systems 
separate flow control for each pressure tube 
p o s i t i v e v o i d rea c t i v i t y co e f f i c i en t s under most opera t i n g 
conditions 
slow scram system 
steam suppression system 
programmed power setbacks (rather than scrams) for various 
abnormal conditions 
low coolant-to-fuel ratio 
accident localization system 
*"Report on the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, .. NUREG-
1250, Department of Energy/Electric Power Reseach Institute/Environmental 
Protection Agency/Federal Emergency Management Agency/Institute of Nuclear 
Power Operations/Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January, 1987. 
Chernobyl Unit 4 was one of 14 operating RBMK-1000 reactor plants. 
Significant differences exist in RBMK-1000 designs, as they have evolved 
from the early Leningrad design (first-generation RBMK, eight total units) 
to the more modern Smolensk design (second-generation RBMK, six total 
units, including Chernobyl Units 3 and 4). This evolution of the RBMK 
design is often difficult to discern in Soviet literature, and details of 
the plant-specific differences among the 14 plants are not available. 
However, descriptive material of second-generation RBMK-1000 reactors is 
more complete, especially as a result of information in the Soviet report 
on the accident. 
OPERATOR AND PROCEDURAL ERROR. Chronologies of the Chernobyl-4 accident 
reveal a number of operata~ and procedural errors which contributed to the 
ace i dent, which occurred during the performance of a turbine generator 
test. The test procedures had not been adequately reviewed from a safety 
standpoint. Management control of the performance of the test was- not 
maintained; the test procedure was not followed; safety systems were by-
passed; and control rods were operated incorrectly. Operators lost control 
of the reactor during the performance of the test. 
Information available indicates that Chernobyl Unit 4 was one of the 
best of the 14 operating RBMK-1000 units. The training and experience of 
the operating crew may have focused mainly on steady-state operation since 
the reactor operated continually as a base-loaded unit with on-line refuel-
ing. Evidently, very little, if any, training had been conducted on a 
plant simulator. Only one simulator at another site has been mentioned as 
possibly serving the training needs of operators of all RBMK units. 
The U.S. review concluded that the previous excellent performance 
created an attitude in plant personnel that close adherence to procedures 
was unnecessary; in effect, the previous trouble-free operation led to a 
dominating overconfidence. 
The RBMK units had accumulated more than 100 reactor-years of opera-
tion. Chernobyl Unit 4 had been in operation two years. It is not known 
what events had occurred at RBMK units that may have been precursors to the 
April, 1986, accident or what corrective actions had been taken in the 
areds of design, operations, or training. 
AN INDUSTRY VIEW. The Atomic Industrial Forum, which refers to itself as 
11 the association of the nuclear industry," stated in an annual overview of 
the state of that industry:* 

Chernobyl was the ultimate civilian nuclear disaster: It 
resulted in total destruction of a power reactor, widespread 
distribution of radioactive materials over a broad area of the 
globe, prompt fatalities (31), and the possibility of future 
health effects. The accident raised questions in the minds of 
public officials, and triggered a review of emergency proce-
dures as well as a new look at some U.S. containment systems. 
In many countries, including the United States, Chernobyl was 
cited by some as a reason to close or delay startup of nuclear 
power plants. 
AIF concluded, however, that 11 both the design characteristics of the 
Chernobyl-type reactor and the procedures fo 11 owed by its operators 
cornbine~d to create a situation that would not be duplicated anywhere else 
in the world." The AIF statement continued by quoting the Association's 
President, Carl Walske. 
A c co r d i n g to W a 1 s k e , 11 C he r no by 1 en t e r s t he h i s to r y boo k s as the 
accident that proved the basic correctness of nuclear power design and 
operating decisions made in the West more than two decades ago. The major 
lessons of Chernobyl are to be learned by the Soviets." 
* " The N u c 1 e a r I n d us t r y i n 198 6 : A Yea r of I nco n g r u i t i e s , 11 I n f o News Re -
lease, Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., December 12, 1986. 
H~PLICATIONS OF THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT. Conclusions being drawn about 
c au s e s of the a c c i dent at Chern o by 1 - 4 i n April , 1 9 8 6 , p o i, n t to m a n a gem en t 
and administrative control breakdown, operator errors, procedural and 
training deficiencies, equipment and system design inadequacies, and equip-
ment fa i 1 u res. 
Compounding factors were inattentiveness, low levels of diligence, and 
overconfidence by responsible personnel, who tended to trust previous 
experience rather than carefully-developed procedure. 
Additionally, the simultaneous occurrence of a number of these factors 
was unanticipated or unforeseen in the development of planning scenarios on 
which Chernobyl~4 operations were based. 
Apart from any arguable technological similarities between Chernobyl-4 
and U.S. nuclear plants, the conceptual problems stated above unquestion-
ably have some parallel outside the Chernobyl-4 experience. 
For example, the following inadequacies were identified in an 
investigation* of the Three Mile Island 2 accident in March, 1979: 
1. Equipment performance (failures and maloperation). 
2. Transient and accident analyses. 
3. Operator training and performance. 
4. Equipment and system design. 
5. Information flow, particularly during the early hours of 
the accident. 
6. Implementation of emergency planning. 
*11 Investigation into the i~arch 29, 1979, Three Mile Island Accident by 
Office of Inspection and Enforcement, 11 Investigative Report No. 50-320/ 
79-10, NUREG-0600, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August, 1979. 
The investigative report continued: 
Perhaps the most disturbing result of the IE investigation 
i s con f i rm at i on of e a r 1 i e r con c 1 u s i on s that t h e T h r e e M i 1 e 
Island Unit 2 accident could have been prevented, in spite of 
the inadequacies listed. Th~~ design of the plant, the equip-
ment that was installed, the various accident and transient 
analyses, and the emergency procedures were adequate to have 
prevented the serious consequences of the accident, if they had 
been permitted to function or be carried out as planned. For 
example, had the operators allowed the emergency core cooling 
system to perform its intended function, damage to the core 
would most 1 ikely have been prevented. There are other 
examples set forth in the report where, had a particular opera-
tor action been taken, the consequences of the accident could 
have been significantly mitigated. On the other hand, had 
certain equipment been designed differently, it too, could have 
prevented or reduced the consequences of the ace i dent. The 
results of the investigation make it difficult to fault only 
the actions of the operating staff.. There is considerable 
evidence of a "mind set," not only by TMI operators but by 
operators at other plants as well, that overfilling the reactor 
coolant system (making the system solid) was to be avoided at 
a l most any cost • Undue at tent i on by the TM I o p e r a to r s to 
avoiding a solid system led them to ignore other procedural 
instructions and indications that the core was not being 
properly cooled. Without this "mind set" they might well have 
acted to preclude or better mitigate the accident. 
The accidents at Chernobyl-4 and Three Mile Island 2 cannot be dis-
missed as totally unrelated. A pattern of system failure recurs in these 
accidents; the pattern extends to non-nuclear facilities, as well. To cite 
a memorable example, on July 13, 1977, the entire electric load of the Con 
Edison system was lost. New York City and Westchester County were plunged 
into darkness. Electric service to more than 8 million ,people in the 
metro po 1 i tan a rea and to the comm e r c i a 1 and i n d us t r i a 1 users of t h i s a rea 
was interrupted for periods from 5 to 25 hours. Although there was no 
direct loss of life, the economic losses were very large, in part because 
of extensive looting and malicious property damage. 
The collapse of the Con Edison System resulted from a 
combination of natural events, equipment malfunctions, ques-
tionable system design features, and operating errors. Of 
paramount importance, however, was the lack of preparation for 
major emergencies such that operating personnel failed to use 
the facilities at hand to prevent a system-wide failure. Even 
after the loss of major transmission facilities, a complete 
system shutdown could and should have been prevented by a time-
ly increase in Con Edison's in-city generation or by manual 
load shedding.* 
The FERC report went on to identify failures in management responsi-
bility; selection, training, and supervision of system operators; system 
planning, design and operations; equipment inspection and testing, and 
general preparations for a major emergency. 
Clearly evident in reports of all three of these incidents (Chernobyl-
4 in April, 1986; Three Mile Island 2 in March, 1979; and Con Edison of New 
York in July, 1977) is the recurrence of the same generic failures, 
accompanied by recommendations and cautions that these failures be address-
ed in future operations throughout the power industries. The reappearance 
of these same factors in later, and progressively more serious, situations 
seems to indicate that the required lessons may have not been learned. 
*"The Con Edison Power Failure of July 13, and 14, 1977," Final Staff 
Report, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, June, 1978. 
FEDERAL PREEMPTION. One complication of the extension of experience, or 
11 lessons learned, .. to improve safety or efficiency at nuclear power sta-
tions is federal preemption, which in some critical areas removes state 
officials from direct jurisdiction over, or perhaps even knowledge of, 
safety matters. A member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission during the 
Three Mile Island 2 incident has described this dilemma: 
"The consequences of the preemption of the states from 
nuclear safety decision-making came home to roost in the after-
math of Three Mile Island •••• At the point at which the 
federal regulators and the utility were confounded by puzzling 
and dangerous events, 0 Pennsylvania's§ Governor Thornburgh was 
called upon to make the first nuclear power plan·t safety deci-
sion ever entrusted to a state official - whether or not to 
evacuate the surrounding population. 11 * 
I n t h i s res p e c t i t may be noted that the M a i n e Leg i s 1 at u r e recent 1 Y 
enacted legislation creating a State program for the monitoring of safety 
at t~aine Yankee. P.L. 1987,. c. 519 (AN ACT To Establish a State Nuclear 
Safety Inspection and Monitoring Program for Commercial Nuclear Pov1er 
Facilities in the State). 
*
11 Where Ignorant Armies Clash by Night -- Relations-hips Among Nuclear Regu-
lators and Regulated, .. Address by Peter A. Bradford, Chairman, Maine Public 
Utilities Commission, to the Nuclear Plant Safety and Reliability Seminar, 
Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, January 22, 1987. 
DECOMMISSIONING. In 1982, the Nuclear Decommission Financing Act was 
en a c ted , i n w h i c h the M a i n e Leg i s 1 at u re found t h a t " t i me 1 y proper dec o mm i s -
sioning ••• is essential to protect public health, safety, and the envi-
ronment and that the cost of decommissioning will be significant. 11 35-A 
M.R.S.A. 4351 (1). The Legislature also found "that assurance is needed 
that funds will be available for the cost of decommissioning which would 
occur if a nuclear power plant is prematurely closed." 35-A M.R.S.A. 
4351 ( 6). 
The NRC current 1 y recognizes three decommissioning methods - camp 1 ete 
dismantling and removal, in-place encapsulation or "entombment" and moth-
balling - or a combination of these methods. Maine Yankee currently pro-
poses to use the complete dismantling and removal method. Through 1986, 
the Company had collected $13,303,324 for decommissioning costs in accord-
ance with FERC orders approving settlements issued in 1982 and 1985. The 
Company began collecting annual decommissioning charges of $1,826,100 
beginning December 7, 1981. Subsequently, a FERC order increased the 
allowed decommissioning charge to an annual level of $4,000,000 (exclusive 
of any income tax liability), effective January 15, 1985. The $4,000,000 
was based on the approach of escalating, rather than level, collections 
over the operating life of the plant.* 
On June 19, 1987, a FERC order approved a Maine Yankee proposal to 
i n c rea s e dec o mm i s s i on i n g c h a r g e s to an ann u a 1 1 eve 1 of $4 , 7 9 6 , 0 0 0, d u e to 
increases in waste disposal costs at the Chem-Nuclear burial facility in 
Barnwell, South Carolina; these additional payments to the Decommissioning 
Trust Fund began on June 1, 1987. 
*Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Report, Form 1, Year 1986 - Maine 
Yankee Atomic Power Company, Form 10-K - 1986. 
The Decommissioning Fund balance as of December 31, 1986, was 
$15,041,736 (including interest earned). The fund is maintained in the 
Maine National Bank. 
The 1982 Maine statute (35-A r~.R.S.A. 4353) requires the Company to 
s u bm i t a de t a i 1 e d dec o mm i s s i o n i n g f i n a n c i n g p 1 an to t h e P u b 1 i c U t i 1 i t i e s 
Commission for approval~ The Company completed the fi 1 ing of its decom-
missioning financing plan on January 18, 1984. In that plan, a study, done 
in 1983 and adjusted in 1984, estimated decommissioning costs of 
$115,467,000 (in 1983 dollars). 
In March, 1986, Staff Participants in the 1986 Maine Yankee Shutdown 
As s e s s men t e s t i m a ted dec o mrn i s s i on i n g co s t s at $ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ( i n 1 9 8 6 do l -
l a r s ) f o r d i s rna n t l i n g a n d f u l l dec o mm i s s i on i n g o f t he p l a n t • C u r r e n t 
industry estimates for a plant such as Maine Yankee would likely be in the 
range of $190,000,000 to $210,000,000 for the same decommissioning option. 
Maine Yankee has stated its intent to update its decommissioning study 
and reevaluate the adequacy of the annual charge by the end of 1987. 
Some uncertainties persist in factors which comprise decommissioning 
cost analyses, however. NRC has still to release its revised Decommission-
ing Criteria for Nuclear Facilities, initially proposed in February, 1985. 
The State's future situation as of the January 1, 1983 deadline of the 
LLRWPA (at which time the State assumes direct responsibility for all 
low-level waste in Maine) is uncertain. 
The future readiness of DOE to accept high-level waste shipments as of 
1998 is questionable. 
As a result of these uncertainties, the timing of any Maine Yankee 
dec o mm i s s i on i n g , w h i c h of n e cess i t y m us t a w a i t s i t e s for 1 ow- 1 e v e 1 a n d 
high-level waste, is difficult to project. Indeed, Maine Yankee may become 
an interim high-level waste and spent fuel repository, as well as a 
low-level waste site, for an indefinite period, depending on developments 
in these areas and the effect of 35-A M.R.S.A. 4371 (discussed earlier). 
Although not a preferred or even desirable method, long term on site waste 
management has been reviewed by Maine Yankee.* 
Industry experience is rapidly evolving and is scheduled for review in 
an International Decommissioning Symposium in October. This session, 
sponsored by DOE, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Nuclear 
Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
is a follow-up to a DOE symposium in 1982. The ~1PUC Staff plans to be 
represented at the October symposium. 
Finally, with respect to the Legislative finding, 35-A M.R.S.A. 
4356 (6) provides that "assurance is needed that funds will be available 
for the cost of decommissioning which would occur if a nuclear power plant 
is prematurely closed," and 35-A M.R.S.A. 4356 (3) provides that if the 
Decommissioning Trust Fund is insufficient to decommission the plant, the 
licensee would be responsible for the deficiency, but if the Company were 
unable to provide the full amount, the statute provides that owners would 
be jointly and severally responsible for the balance. 
A number of resource documents, representing a wide range of Maine 
Yankee decommissioning topics, has been compiled and is available at the 
Public Utilities Commission Information Resource Center; a partial listing 
of these resources appears on the following pages. 
*"In-Site Decommissioning/Low-Level Waste Management Topical Report,": 
APTR-42, Ebasco Services, Inc. for Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, 
January, 1987. 
MPUC RESOURCES - MAINE YANKEE DECOMMISSIONING 
1. "Final Safety Analysis Report -Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station," 
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, August 1970 
2. "Final Environmental Statement Related to Operation of Maine Yankee 
Atomic Power Station," Directorate of Licensing, U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission, July 1972 
3. "Termination of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Reactors," Regulatory 
Guide 1.86, Directorate of Regulatory Standards, U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission, June 1974 
4. "Potential Radiation Dose to Man from Recycle of Metals Reclaimed from 
a Decommissioned Nuclear Power Plant," NUREG/CR-0134 and ORNL/NUREG/ 
TM-215, Oak Ridge National Laboratory for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, December 1978 
5. "Plan for Reevaluation of NRC Policy on Decommissioning of Nuclear 
Facilities," NUREG-0436 Rev. 1, Office of Standards Development, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 1978 
6. "Technology, Safety and Costs of Decommissioning a Reference Pressur-
ized Water Reactor Power Station," NUREG/CR-0130, Battelle Pacific 
Northwest Laboratory for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 
1978; Addendum, August 1979 
7. "Decommissioning Commercial Nuclear Facilities: A Review and Analysis 
of Current Regulations," NUREG/CR-0671, Pacific Northwest Laboratory 
and Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers for U.S. Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission, August 1979 
8. "Decontamination and Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities," Marilyn 
M. Osterhout, ed.; Proceedings of the American Nuclear Society topical 
meeting in Sun Valley, Idaho, September 16-20, 1979 
9. "Residual Radioactivity 
NUREG-0613, Office qf 
Commission, October 1979 
Limits for Decommissioning - Draft Report," 
Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
10. "Assuring the Availability of Funds for Decommissioning Nuclear Facili-
ties Draft Report," NUREG-0584 Rev. 1, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 1979 
11. "Thoughts on Regulation Changes for Decommissioning - Draft Report," 
NUREG-0590 Rev. 1, Office of Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, December 1979 
12. "Financing Strategies for Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning," NUREG/ 
CR-1481, New England Conference of Public Utilities Commissioners, 
Inc./Temple, Barker & Sloan, Inc. for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion, July 1980 
13. "A Methodology for Calculating Residual Radioactivity Levels Following 
Decommissioning," NUREG-0707, Office of Standards Development, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 1980 
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14. "Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of 
Nuclear Facilities," NUREG-0586, Office of Standards Development, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 1981 
15. "Decontamination Processes for Restorative Operations and as a Pre-
cursor to Decommissioning: A Literature Review," NUREG/CR-1915 and 
PNL-3706 lD, WD, Pacific Northwest Laboratory for U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, May 1981 
16. "Monitoring for Compliance with Decommissioning Termination Survey 
Criteria," NUREG/CR-2082 and ORNL/HASRD-95, Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1981 
17. "Technology and Cost of Termination Surveys Associated with Decommis-
sioning of Nuclear Facilities," NUREG/CR-2441 and ORNL/HASRD-121, Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
February 1982 
18. "The 
Maine 
1982 
Impacts of Early Retirement of Nuclear Power Plants: The Case of 
Yankee," ESRG 82-91, Energy Systems Research Group, Inc., August 
19. "The Decommissioning of Nuclear Plants," International Atomic Energy 
Agency, August 1982 
20. "Funding Nuclear Power Plant 
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